2018 IL App (2d) 170328
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- Patrick Wilber was charged with two counts of harassment by electronic communication for threatening Clarence and Carol Reinke; the trial court found a bona fide doubt as to Wilber’s fitness to stand trial.
- Wilber filed a lengthy pro se submission insisting he was merely angry and figurative when he said "kill," and contesting police evidence; he repeatedly insisted he was fit.
- A jury fitness hearing was held; jury selection and advocacy were minimal (no for-cause challenges, no peremptories, no opening statements); the prosecutor informed the court he expected to be unable to meet the State’s burden.
- The State’s fitness witness, clinical psychologist Jennifer Aurand, testified that after a 3.5–hour evaluation Wilber’s answers were tangential/circumstantial, his affect labile, and he met criteria for bipolar I disorder; she concluded he could not assist in his defense (unfit).
- At the close of the State’s case, Wilber’s trial counsel moved for a directed verdict of unfitness despite Wilber’s insistence he was fit; the court granted the motion.
- Wilber appealed, arguing the directed verdict was improper (because the proceeding was nonadversarial and he had no advocate for his claimed fitness) and that counsel’s failure to press his claim of fitness deprived him of effective assistance; the appellate court affirmed under the public‑interest exception to mootness.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Wilber's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may grant a directed verdict of unfitness at a jury fitness hearing when the State and defense counsel conclude the defendant is unfit but the defendant insists he is fit | Directed verdicts are governed by the Pedrick standard; no special, more defendant-favoring rule for fitness hearings is required; directed verdict is proper when evidence so overwhelmingly favors unfitness that no contrary verdict could stand | Directed verdict improper because fitness hearings may be nonadversarial; without an advocate for fitness the jury never heard evidence that might have shown fitness | Affirmed. The Pedrick standard applies; trial court properly granted directed verdict based on the overwhelming evidence of unfitness. |
| Whether defense counsel’s failure to argue the defendant’s insistence on fitness constitutes per se ineffective assistance (presumed prejudice) | Counsel is not required to press a position that would violate due process by putting an arguably unfit defendant to trial; Cronic presumption applies only when counsel entirely fails to test the State’s case | Counsel was ineffective per se because he failed to advocate Wilber’s asserted fitness, leaving Wilber no realistic opportunity to prove fitness | Affirmed. No per se ineffective-assistance finding. Counsel need not defer to a defendant’s insistence on fitness and did not wholly fail to subject the State’s case to testing. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Shum, 207 Ill. 2d 47 (establishes fitness-to-stand-trial standard)
- Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494 (standard for directed verdicts)
- People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177 (upholding directed verdict in fitness context)
- People v. Brown, 31 Ill. 2d 415 (upholding directed verdict in fitness context)
- Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (due process requires sufficient competence to consult with counsel)
- Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (due process requires inquiry into competence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ordinary ineffective-assistance standard)
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (presumed prejudice when counsel does not meaningfully test prosecution)
- People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449 (applying Cronic principles in Illinois)