People v. White
242 P.3d 1121
Colo.2010Background
- White was convicted of sexual assault on a child, incest, and possession of marijuana. One juror moved to Colorado Springs after summons, prompting a mistrial motion; trial court denied, finding residency. Court of Appeals reversed, holding the juror lacked Teller County residency because he intended to stay outside the county for 18–24 months with no immediate return. Statutory framework: UJSSA §13-71-105 defines residency (live in county >50% of time or reside in county) and disqualifies those with outside residence and no intention to return within 12 months; sources for juror master list include voter, driver, and tax records. Majority construes residency to permit flexibility consistent with mobility; juror continued to domicile Teller County despite temporary absence. Case remanded to reinstate convictions; Justice Martinez dissents.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| How should residency be interpreted for juror qualification under 13-71-105? | People argues broad residency/domicile acceptable; juror remained Teller County domiciled. | White argues the juror ceased Teller County residency and lacked intent to return within 12 months. | Residency can be maintained despite temporary absence; juror remained Teller County resident. |
| Does the juror’s absence from Teller County negate qualification under 13-71-105(2)(e)? | Juror’s present intent to return and maintain domicile keeps qualification. | Absence with no intended return within 12 months should disqualify. | Disqualification not triggered; present intent to return preserves qualification. |
| Is the principal-or-primary-home test appropriate for juror residency under the UJSSA? | Majority adopts broad domicile approach consistent with modern mobility. | Text of 13-71-105(1) does not define residency; principal-or-primary-home import is inappropriate. | Court adopts domicile-based interpretation; principal-or-primary-home test not required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Aurora v. Rhodes, 689 P.2d 603 (Colo.1984) (jury trial requires representative cross-section and reasonable proximity)
- Gordon v. Blackburn, 618 P.2d 668 (Colo.1980) (voting residence embodies principal home and present intent to return)
- People v. Williams, 827 P.2d 612 (Colo.App.1992) (absence with intent to return affects residence for juror purposes)
- Theobald v. Byrns, 195 Colo. 330, 579 P.2d 609 (Colo.1978) (historic ambiguity in defining residence)
- Owens, 228 P.3d 969 (Colo.2010) (statutory interpretation depends on legislative intent)