43 Cal.App.5th 375
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- On April 2, 2016, Fish & Wildlife officers recovered 29 commercial Dungeness crab traps from a state marine conservation area; buoys on the traps bore defendant Gerard Wetle’s commercial license (L) number. 25 traps were inside the protected area; some traps had bait placements that disabled the destruction device.
- Each trap also bore a buoy tag with a Dungeness crab permit number linked to a vessel (Pacific Spirit) owned by Wetle’s father and wife; Guy Bond (skipper of the Pacific Spirit) testified he leased and operated the traps and placed them in the protected area while Wetle was in Mexico.
- Wetle testified he was in Mexico working on a boat at the time; other witnesses corroborated his absence. The prosecutor argued strict liability and that Wetle’s L number on the buoys made him responsible regardless of his physical presence or whether Bond placed the gear.
- A jury convicted Wetle of 28 misdemeanor regulatory violations (14 CCR § 632 and § 180.2). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Wetle on probation; he appealed.
- The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the trial court committed prejudicial instructional error by failing to instruct the jury on the actus reus elements of the charged strict-liability offenses; the court rejected Wetle’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim and allowed the People the option to retry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury was properly instructed on elements of strict-liability regulatory offenses (14 CCR § 632, § 180.2) | The offenses are strict liability; presence of Wetle’s L number and his connection to the traps made him criminally responsible regardless of presence or who physically placed traps | A conviction required proof Wetle himself committed the prohibited act (injure/damage/take/possess marine resources or used a trap lacking a destruction device); he was abroad and did not place the traps | Trial court failed to instruct on the actus reus elements; error was not harmless and convictions reversed (People may retry) |
| Whether vicarious liability or entrustment sufficed to convict | Wetle entrusted traps to Bond; his close connection and profit motive justify conviction under strict liability | No legal basis was shown to impute criminal liability for a third party’s acts absent agency/employer relationship or proof Wetle committed the prohibited act | Court rejected the People’s vicarious-liability theory; absent evidence Bond acted as Wetle’s agent/employer, entrustment alone is insufficient |
| Whether evidence was insufficient (double jeopardy bar to retrial) | L-number on buoys and officer testimony that the L-number denotes the operator supplied substantial proof Wetle was responsible | Witnesses (Wetle, Erardi, Bond, Wetle’s father) placed Wetle in Mexico and attributed placement to Bond; testimony created reasonable doubt | Court held the record contained substantial evidence supporting the convictions if the jury disbelieved defense witnesses; insufficiency claim rejected, so retrial is not barred |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Rivera, 7 Cal.5th 306 (2019) (trial court has sua sponte duty to instruct on essential elements; failure is a serious constitutional error)
- People v. McCoy, 25 Cal.4th 1111 (2001) (criminal offenses consist of actus reus and mens rea; public-welfare offenses are the mens rea exception)
- People v. Rubalcava, 23 Cal.4th 322 (2000) (public welfare / strict liability offense principles)
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (distinguishing requirement of intent where applicable; discussed in context of strict liability analysis)
- People v. Chevron Chemical Co., 143 Cal.App.3d 50 (1983) (analysis of whether an offense is strict liability; corporate vicarious liability discussion)
- People v. Merritt, 2 Cal.5th 819 (2017) (instructional omissions of elements are reversible unless court can say beyond a reasonable doubt a properly instructed jury would reach the same verdict)
- United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (double jeopardy bars retrial only if reversal was based on insufficiency of the evidence)