People v. Weber, 2021 IL App (2d) 190841

On July 28, 2014, Anthony Weber fired a gun at four boys riding past his house, shooting one boy in the leg; he was charged with multiple counts including attempted murder, aggravated discharge of a firearm, and aggravated battery with a firearm.
At trial the jury convicted Weber of reckless discharge on the attempted-murder counts, aggravated discharge on four counts, and aggravated battery with a firearm; the State then nol-prossed all counts except aggravated battery and Weber was sentenced to 16 years.
Weber’s direct appeal was affirmed. He then filed a pro se petition under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 asserting his conviction was void due to legally inconsistent verdicts and alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.
In two footnotes to the 2-1401 petition Weber asked the court, alternatively, to treat the pleading as a postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.) and to deem it timely if so converted.
The trial court dismissed the 2-1401 petition and declined to recharacterize it as a postconviction petition, reasoning recharacterization was discretionary and that Weber’s claims were waived.
The appellate court reversed, holding Weber’s petition satisfied section 122-1(d) (it named/cited the Act), so the trial court erred in refusing to treat the filing as a postconviction petition and, because the court failed to act within the Act’s 90-day first-stage period, remanded for stage-two proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a trial court must treat a pleading as a postconviction petition when the pleading specifies it seeks relief under the Act	State: Stoffel allows trial courts discretion not to recharacterize pro se pleadings; such decisions are not reviewable	Weber: He satisfied §122-1(d) by naming/citing the Act in his petition’s footnotes and requested conversion if 2-1401 relief were denied	Held: Weber met §122-1(d); because the petition expressly sought relief under the Act, the court was required to consider it as a postconviction petition (Stoffel not controlling)
Whether the petition should be placed at first-stage or proceed further given trial-court delay	State: Trial court’s conclusion that claims were waived justified refusal to proceed	Weber: Even if conversion were required, the court failed to follow statutory timing for first-stage review	Held: Trial court waited 199 days to act; because it failed to rule within the Act’s 90-day first-stage window, the petition must be remanded for stage-two proceedings (appointment of counsel/amendment)

People v. McDonald, 373 Ill. App. 3d 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that where §122-1(d) satisfied, petition must be processed under Act; guides remand procedure)
People v. Stoffel, 239 Ill. 2d 314 (Ill. 2010) (discusses trial-court discretion to recharacterize pleadings not labeled under the Act)
People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45 (Ill. 2005) (describes practice of recharacterization of pro se pleadings as postconviction petitions)
People v. McNett, 361 Ill. App. 3d 444 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (addresses appellate reclassification of pleading into a statutorily authorized collateral attack)
People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (Ill. 1999) (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel can excuse waiver of claims)
People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89 (Ill. 2002) (describes the Act’s three-stage postconviction framework and first-stage gist standard)
People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1 (Ill. 2004) (principles of statutory interpretation)
People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427 (Ill. 2005) (courts should not read into statutes exceptions that contradict legislative intent)