People v. Washington
195 N.E.3d 326
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- In June 2014 Ronald Smith was beaten; in July 2014 Tory Rashad Washington (age 19) was charged with multiple counts of murder arising from that beating.
- In September 2015 Washington pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement: he would plead to one count, testify against codefendants, the State would dismiss remaining counts and recommend a 35-year cap (and not seek a wanton-cruelty natural-life enhancement).
- At plea the court and parties mistakenly stated that a wanton-cruelty finding would result in mandatory natural life (the correct exposure was up to natural life).
- In April 2016 Washington was sentenced to 32 years; he filed motions to withdraw his plea and to reconsider sentence but later voluntarily withdrew those motions and did not appeal.
- In December 2019 Washington filed a pro se postconviction petition asserting (1) truth-in-sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied to those under 21, (2) his plea was involuntary because of Eighth Amendment implications, and (3) the court failed to properly consider his youth; the trial court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit.
- Washington appealed; the Fourth District affirmed, holding Miller and related juvenile Eighth Amendment precedents do not extend to nonjuveniles who received a non‑life sentence, the truth-in-sentencing statute was constitutionally applied, the involuntary-plea claim failed, and any reliance on an unpublished order was harmless error.
Issues
| Issue | People (Plaintiff) Argument | Washington (Defendant) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of juvenile Eighth Amendment cases (Miller) to "emerging adults" (18–20) | Miller and progeny apply only to juveniles; Washington was not a juvenile. | Miller and related decisions should be extended to "emerging adults" whose brains/maturity are still developing. | Rejected — Miller and its progeny do not apply to nonjuveniles who were not sentenced to natural or de facto life. |
| As-applied challenge to truth-in-sentencing statute under Illinois proportionate-penalties clause | Statute is constitutional as applied; defendant’s sentence is within statutory range and precedent supports constitutionality. | Applying truth-in-sentencing to someone <21 is disproportionate given developmental science and legislative changes. | Rejected — no Illinois authority extending juvenile protections to adults; legislation allowing limited parole prospectively does not support retroactive relief. |
| Involuntariness of guilty plea based on threat of unconstitutional life sentence | Plea was knowing and voluntary; defendant withdrew related postplea motions and waived appeals. | Plea induced by threat of unconstitutional natural-life exposure, so it was involuntary. | Rejected — no arguable claim: Washington was an adult and received a 32‑year term, not life or de facto life; withdrawal of postplea motions undermines claim. |
| Reliance on unpublished authority by trial court | N/A | Trial court erred by citing an unpublished appellate order (People v. Cohn). | Error acknowledged but harmless because the court’s correct reasoning rested on other, published precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (juvenile nonhomicide life-without-parole requires meaningful opportunity for release)
- Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (U.S. 2021) (no separate permanent-incorrigibility finding required before life-without-parole for juveniles)
- People v. Holman, 91 N.E.3d 849 (Ill. 2017) (sentencer must consider juvenile’s youth and attendant characteristics)
- People v. Harris, 120 N.E.3d 900 (Ill. 2018) (for sentencing purposes, age 18 marks line between juveniles and adults)
- People v. Buffer, 137 N.E.3d 763 (Ill. 2019) (a juvenile sentence of 40 years or less is not a de facto life sentence)