People v. Veach
50 N.E.3d 87
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- Defendant Blackie Veach was convicted by a jury (July 2013) of two counts of attempted first‑degree murder and two counts of aggravated battery for cutting the throats of Matthew Price and Renee Strohl; the court sentenced him to consecutive 16‑year terms on the attempt counts.
- At trial the State published recorded police interviews (CDs) of three witnesses (Johnny Price, Matthew Price, Renee Strohl). The defense and prosecution stipulated on the record to admission and publication of those recordings; the court confirmed defendant waived foundational objections.
- The recordings largely repeated witness trial testimony (prior consistent statements) and included references to uncharged bad acts/character (e.g., alleged gang affiliation, drinking/violence, forcing drug use).
- Defendant’s sole claim on appeal: trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to admission/publication of the recordings that contained prior consistent statements and bad‑character evidence.
- The appellate majority concluded the record did not explain why defense counsel stipulated (i.e., matters outside the record were critical) and therefore invoked the Kunze/Massaro line to decline review on direct appeal, affirming the convictions and advising relief via postconviction proceedings. Justice Appleton dissented, arguing the record showed counsel’s on‑the‑record acts could and should be adjudicated on direct appeal and that counsel’s stipulation was unreasonable and prejudicial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Veach) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to admission/publication of witness police recordings containing prior consistent statements and bad‑character material | The record does not show counsel’s subjective reasons; the appellate court should decline direct review and preserve the claim for postconviction proceedings | Stipulation admitted inadmissible hearsay (prior consistent statements) and improper propensity/bad‑acts evidence, causing prejudice; counsel’s on‑the‑record agreement is reviewable now | Majority: Declined to adjudicate on direct appeal (Category A) because resolution requires matters outside the record; affirmed convictions and noted remedy under the Post‑Conviction Hearing Act. Dissent: Claim is record‑based and counsel’s stipulation was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial; would reverse. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (right to counsel) (establishing Sixth Amendment right to counsel)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard) (performance + prejudice test)
- Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (direct v. collateral review) (prefer collateral review for ineffective‑assistance claims when record is incomplete)
- People v. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d 122 (state sup. ct.) (direct‑appeal insufficiency to resolve ineffectiveness claims when suppression motion omitted; postconviction preferred)
- People v. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d 708 (4th Dist.) (developing doctrine that direct appeals often must defer ineffective‑assistance claims to collateral proceedings)
- People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512 (IL sup. ct.) (example of record‑based ineffective assistance that warranted reversal on direct appeal)
- People v. Fillyaw, 409 Ill. App. 3d 302 (2d Dist.) (trial counsel’s failure to object to inadmissible prior statements constituted ineffective assistance on the record)