People v. Vara
68 N.E.3d 1018
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- Defendant Ricardo Vara (then 57) sent an explicit text to J.D., an 11‑year‑old girl living with his family, saying he wanted to make love to her "pink hot pussy." The message was sent from defendant’s phone on January 14, 2013.
- J.D.’s mother discovered the message; police matched the message to defendant’s phone. Defendant claimed the message was sent by mistake and intended for others.
- Defendant waived a jury and submitted to a stipulated bench trial. The court found the text message itself dispositive and convicted defendant of grooming under 720 ILCS 5/11‑25(a) (West 2012).
- Defendant moved to vacate and for a new trial arguing statutory ambiguity: he contended section 11‑25 required that the child be enticed to commit a sex offense (which would be impossible here), not that the defendant enticed the child to have sex with the defendant. The motions were denied.
- The trial court sentenced defendant to 24 months’ imprisonment. On appeal defendant’s sole issue was statutory construction of the grooming statute. The appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Vara) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §11‑25 requires that the child be enticed to personally commit a sex offense, or instead that the defendant enticed the child to engage in sexual conduct with the defendant | Statute criminalizes using electronic means to seduce/solicit/lure/entice a child to commit any sex offense; commas and grammar show the phrase “to commit any sex offense” refers to the actor (the groomer) — i.e., the defendant’s intent to cause sexual conduct with the child | The plain meaning of “solicit/entice/seduce/lure” (and §2‑20 definition of “solicit”) requires persuading someone to commit an offense; thus §11‑25 requires that the child be urged to commit a sex offense (impossible here for predatory criminal sexual assault) and conviction fails | The court held §11‑25 covers conduct by which a defendant uses electronic means to seduce/solicit/lure/entice a child to engage in sexual conduct with the defendant (including conduct amounting to predatory criminal sexual assault); defendant’s reading is rejected. |
| Whether grooming under §11‑25 is superfluous or unconstitutionally overlaps with indecent solicitation (§11‑6) and raises proportionality concerns | Grooming and indecent solicitation have different elements (e.g., grooming requires electronic device and can target guardians; solicitation requires requesting the child perform a sexual act); prosecutor may choose appropriate charge; no proportionate‑penalties violation because elements differ | If §11‑25 punished urging a child to personally commit a sex offense, it would duplicate §11‑6 and create sentencing anomalies (a lesser class felony for the same underlying solicitation) | Court held the statutes serve different purposes and have distinct elements; no superfluity or proportionate‑penalties violation. |
Key Cases Cited
- People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264 (discussing statutory construction principles) (court cites general rules that legislative intent governs)
- People v. Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d 416 (statutory construction: consider purpose and consequences) (used to explain interpretive approach)
- People v. Roberts, 27 Ill. App. 3d 489 (1975) (prosecutorial discretion to charge under overlapping statutes)
- People v. Arndt, 351 Ill. App. 3d 505 (indecent solicitation requires requesting child perform sexual act) (supports distinction between solicitation and grooming)
- People v. Qualls, 365 Ill. App. 3d 1015 (noscitur a sociis doctrine) (used to construe words by their context)
- People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166 (assessment of appellate costs) (cited for awarding appeal costs)
- People v. Bingham, 2014 IL 115964 (dictionary use for plain meaning) (supports reliance on ordinary meaning of statutory terms)