People v. Valdez
10 Cal. App. 5th 1338
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 2001 Valdez was convicted of (1) possession of a sharp instrument in prison (Pen. Code § 4502(a)) and (2) assault by an inmate by means likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 4501); trial court found three prior strikes and imposed consecutive 25-to-life terms; conviction was previously affirmed on appeal.
- In December 1998 correctional officers searched Valdez’s administrative segregation cell while he and his cellmate were at the shower and recovered an altered toothbrush with a razor blade hidden in an upper cubicle; only the two cellmates had access to the cell.
- Valdez petitioned under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36) for recall/resentencing (§ 1170.126), claiming eligibility because his current offenses were not "serious" or "violent" under the Act and arguing he was not "armed" during the offenses.
- The trial court denied the petition, finding Valdez ineligible because he was "armed with a deadly weapon" during possession and also on the assault count; the court also rejected an Apprendi-based claim that disqualifying facts must be pleaded and jury-found beyond a reasonable doubt.
- On appeal the published portion addresses whether substantial evidence supported the finding Valdez was "armed" when he possessed the weapon in his cell and therefore ineligible for resentencing; the court affirms.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Valdez’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May the trial court make factual findings in a § 1170.126 resentencing proceeding (or must disqualifying facts be pleaded and jury-found per Apprendi)? | Trial court may make findings; resentencing is a downward proceeding and Apprendi jury-proof requirement does not apply. | Apprendi requires disqualifying facts that increase punishment be pleaded and jury-found beyond a reasonable doubt. | The court agreed with People: Apprendi does not bar trial-court factfinding in § 1170.126 proceedings. |
| Was there substantial evidence Valdez was "armed" with the hidden razor for purposes of Prop. 36’s disqualification? | The weapon was kept in Valdez’s cell, he spent most time there, possession is a continuing offense, and availability at any time during possession suffices to show he was armed. | Because Valdez was away and under supervision when the weapon was found, the razor was not readily accessible at the moment of discovery and thus he was not "armed." | Substantial evidence supported the trial court: constructive/continuing possession and prior availability make Valdez "armed" during the commission of the possession offense, so he is ineligible. |
| What temporal or facilitative nexus is required between possession and arming under Prop. 36? | Arming requires only a temporal nexus: weapon available at any time during possession; facilitative nexus (weapon used to further another felony) is not required. | Argued narrower temporal nexus should be applied; being physically away from the weapon when found can negate arming. | Court holds only temporal nexus is required for possession offenses: if weapon was available for use at any time during possession, defendant is "armed." |
| If one conviction is ineligible but another is eligible, must resentencing be applied count-by-count? | Not directly argued at trial court (trial court followed precedent treating any ineligible conviction as barring relief). | Valdez argued both convictions are eligible; alternatively sought resentencing on any eligible count. | Court notes controlling authority (People v. Johnson) requires count-by-count analysis, but here Valdez was ineligible on both counts; therefore petition denial affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Bland, 10 Cal.4th 991 (1995) (possession is a continuing offense; firearm found near drugs can support inference defendant was armed at some point during possession)
- People v. Johnson, 61 Cal.4th 674 (2015) (Prop. 36 resentencing eligibility must be evaluated count-by-count)
- People v. Hicks, 231 Cal.App.4th 275 (2014) (Prop. 36 disqualifies inmate if armed during commission of possession offense; only temporal nexus required)
- People v. Osuna, 225 Cal.App.4th 1020 (2014) (defendant actually seen holding a handgun at stop; discussion of scenarios where constructive possession alone may not be "arming")
- People v. Delgadillo, 132 Cal.App.4th 1570 (2005) (following Bland: guns found in home during drug investigation support finding defendant was armed during continuous possession)
- People v. Elder, 227 Cal.App.4th 1308 (2014) (court observed not every possession conviction establishes arming where weapon not readily accessible at discovery)
- People v. White, 223 Cal.App.4th 512 (2014) (availability/ready access constitutes arming; possession does not always equal being armed)