2016 COA 62
Colo. Ct. App.2016Background
- While serving a 35-year DOC prison sentence, Edward Valadez committed third-degree assault in 2007 and was sentenced in 2008 to 15 months in county jail, ordered consecutive to his prison term.
- The mittimus reflected consecutive sentences, but Valadez was returned to DOC to continue serving his prison sentence, leaving the county-jail term as an outstanding detainer.
- The detainer affected Valadez's parole eligibility and access to transitional placements; he filed a Crim. P. 35(a) motion in 2014 seeking correction under section 18-1.3-501(1)(c).
- Section 18-1.3-501(1)(c) generally prohibits ordering county jail time consecutively to a state correctional facility sentence, but allows an exception "if, at the time of sentencing" the court determines concurrent sentence is not warranted and then "may order" the misdemeanor sentence be served prior to the DOC sentence (including "all or the remainder").
- The district court denied relief, interpreting the statute as inapplicable because Valadez was already serving his prison sentence when sentenced for the misdemeanor.
- The appellate court reviewed de novo, found the statute ambiguous as applied, examined legislative history, and concluded the legislature intended that when a consecutive jail term is ordered it must be served before the remainder of the DOC sentence (i.e., the DOC term is tolled and resumed afterward).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 18-1.3-501(1)(c) requires a consecutive county jail sentence to be served before the remainder of an already-begun DOC sentence | Valadez: statute requires the county jail term to be served prior to the DOC term (removing detainer) | People/District Ct: statute applies only to DOC sentences "to be served" (not already being served); thus jail can follow DOC | Court: statute ambiguous; legislative history shows "may" is mandatory here — jail must be served first, then the remainder of DOC sentence |
| Whether Valadez's Crim. P. 35(a) claim was timely and cognizable | Valadez: claim "not authorized by law" so may be raised anytime | People: challenged timeliness/appropriateness of Crim. P. 35(a) relief | Court: claim is properly raised under Crim. P. 35(a) as a sentence "not authorized by law" and is timely |
| Whether the court could impose a consecutive county jail sentence at all given prior precedent | Valadez: alternatively argued consecutive jail might be impermissible | People: relied on older precedent limiting consecutive jail-to-prison sequencing | Court: § 18-1.3-501(1)(c) authorizes consecutive jail sentences but requires they be served before the DOC remainder |
| Whether administrative or statutory conflicts (e.g., § 17-22.5-402(1)) bar tolling DOC and sending inmate to county jail first | People: interrupting DOC creates discharge/conflict/administrative problems | Court: "discharge" not read to prohibit temporary remand; if conflict exists §18-1.3-501(1)(c) is more specific and controls |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415 (Colo. App. 2006) (sentence "not authorized by law" may be raised at any time)
- People v. Bassford, 343 P.3d 1003 (Colo. App. 2014) (legality of a sentence is reviewed de novo)
- Reno v. Marks, 349 P.3d 248 (Colo. 2015) (statutory interpretation: plain language controls when unambiguous)
- Danielson v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 791 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1990) ("may" can be construed as mandatory when necessary to effectuate legislative purpose)
- Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007) (sponsor testimony can illuminate legislative intent)
- People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410 (Colo. 2005) (legislative committee testimony aids in discerning intent)
- People v. Green, 734 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1987) (earlier precedent on sentencing sequencing)
- People v. Battle, 742 P.2d 952 (Colo. App. 1987) (earlier precedent on sentencing sequencing)