People v. United States Fire Insurance
242 Cal. App. 4th 991
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Surety (United States Fire Insurance Co.) posted a $25,000 bail bond for Hernandez‑Guzman who failed to appear; notice of forfeiture was served 8/28/2013.
- The statutory exoneration/appearance period is 185 days (180 days plus 5 mailing days); the court may extend that period up to 180 days “from its order” under §1305.4.
- Surety timely filed a first §1305.4 motion; the trial court granted an extension on 3/25/2014 and (erroneously, per parties) wrote the extended deadline as 8/28/2014.
- On 8/28/2014 Surety filed a second §1305.4 extension motion (timely); while that motion was pending the County demanded immediate summary judgment and the court entered summary judgment on 9/3/2014.
- Surety moved promptly to set aside the summary judgment and argued the pending extension motion made the prior summary judgment premature; the trial court denied the motion and Surety appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (County/People) | Defendant's Argument (Surety) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment entered while a timely §1305.4 extension motion was pending was premature | Summary judgment valid because Surety already exhausted maximum time (185 + 180 = 365 days) so no viable extension was pending | The pending, timely extension motion postponed the right to enter summary judgment; entering judgment while the motion was pending was premature | Court held the summary judgment was prematurely entered while the timely extension motion was pending and thus was voidable and should have been set aside |
| How to measure the 180‑day §1305.4 extension (from court order vs. from end of exoneration period) | Extension is effectively measured from end of original exoneration period (so total cannot exceed 365 days) | Statute’s plain language (“to a time not exceeding 180 days from its order”) means the extension runs from the date of the court’s order | Court held extension runs from the date of the court’s order; therefore additional extension time was available when Surety’s second motion was filed |
| Whether trial court erred in refusing to set aside the prematurely entered summary judgment | Court asserted no further extension time existed, so denial proper | Surety argued timely motion to set aside should have been granted because judgment was entered in excess of jurisdiction while a motion was pending | Court agreed with Surety: the summary judgment was entered in excess of jurisdiction and must be set aside on remand |
| Whether the bond should be exonerated on remand | County opposed exoneration | Surety argued bond should be exonerated (also relied on §1306(c) 90‑day timing rule) | Court ordered summary judgment reversed and remanded with directions to set aside the judgment and exonerate the bond (§1306(c) triggered because no valid summary judgment was entered within 90 days after it could first be entered) |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., 33 Cal.4th 653 (Cal. 2004) (describes statutory framework and notes extension runs 180 days from the trial court’s order)
- People v. Granite State Insurance Co., 114 Cal.App.4th 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (timely motion to vacate or extend filed before expiration postpones when summary judgment may first be entered)
- People v. Aegis Security Ins. Co., 130 Cal.App.4th 1071 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (summary judgment premature where timely motion to extend was pending)
- People v. Taylor Billingslea Bail Bonds, 74 Cal.App.4th 1193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (pre‑1999 amendment view that total extension effectively measured from end of exoneration period)
- County of Los Angeles v. Williamsburg National Ins. Co., 235 Cal.App.4th 944 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (rejects Taylor Billingslea post‑1999 amendment; confirms extension measured from date of court’s order)