2019 CO 15
Colo.2019Background
- On the morning trial was to begin, defendant April Travis asked for a continuance to “look for and pay for an attorney.” She was represented by the public defender and had previously received one continuance.
- The trial court denied the last-minute continuance, told Travis her public defenders were experienced and had prepared the case, and offered that she could proceed pro se if she wished. Travis elected to proceed with appointed counsel and was convicted.
- On appeal Travis argued her request invoked the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and required the trial court to apply the multi-factor test from People v. Brown. A division of the court of appeals agreed.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Brown’s eleven-factor test applies when a defendant only expresses a vague desire to seek new counsel but has not identified or retained replacement counsel.
- The Supreme Court held that a bare, general request to “look for and pay for an attorney” does not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and that Brown’s specific on-the-record balancing is not required in that circumstance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brown’s eleven-factor counsel-of-choice test applies when defendant only requests time to look for and possibly pay for a lawyer | People: Brown applies whenever a defendant requests a continuance to obtain new counsel on the eve of trial | Travis: her request invoked her right to counsel of choice, so Brown factors were required | Court: Brown does not apply to a vague, unformed request to “look for and pay for an attorney”; Brown requires identification/steps toward retention |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the trial-day continuance | People: denial was within discretion because request was vague, case had prior continuance, and public defenders were prepared | Travis: denial harmed her Sixth Amendment right to obtain counsel of her choice | Court: no abuse of discretion; trial court considered relevant circumstances and informed Travis of right to proceed pro se |
| Whether Ronquillo requires Brown analysis when new counsel is not identified | People: Ronquillo permits Brown analysis only where the type of replacement counsel (e.g., appointed counsel) is known or identifiable | Travis: Ronquillo’s allowance to fire counsel without cause means Brown should apply broadly | Court: Ronquillo does not extend Brown to wholly speculative requests where no identified counsel or assured appointment exists |
| Whether reversal requires a showing of prejudice or is harmless error | People: any error in failing to apply Brown should be assessed for abuse of discretion and harmlessness | Travis: failure to apply Brown was reversible because Sixth Amendment implicated | Court: no Brown error occurred; thus no prejudice analysis required; denial not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Brown, 322 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2014) (sets eleven-factor Brown test for continuances to allow counsel of choice to prepare)
- Ronquillo v. People, 404 P.3d 264 (Colo. 2017) (recognizes right to fire retained counsel without showing good cause and directs Brown analysis when seeking continuance to obtain appointed counsel)
- People v. Hampton, 758 P.2d 1344 (Colo. 1988) (review of continuance denials when counsel-of-choice not implicated looks to totality of circumstances)
- Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1964) (federal standard for reviewing denial of continuances considers reasons presented to trial judge)
- People v. Crow, 789 P.2d 1104 (Colo. 1990) (appellate review limits: continuance denial reversed only if manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair)