People v. Townsel
63 Cal. 4th 25
Cal.2016Background
- In 1989 Anthony Townsel shot and killed Mauricio Martinez and Martha Diaz (who was six months pregnant) and was convicted of two counts of first‑degree murder; the jury found multiple‑murder and witness‑killing special‑circumstance allegations true and returned a death verdict. The jury also convicted him of attempting to dissuade a witness; acquitted of shooting at an inhabited dwelling.
- Defense presented evidence from three psychologists that Townsel was intellectually disabled (IQ scores ranging from 47 to 66) and argued this undercut premeditation/deliberation and related mens rea. Prosecution rebutted with psychiatrist Dr. Lee Coleman, who criticized the reliability and forensic value of psychological testing.
- Pretrial competency proceedings under Penal Code §1368 occurred; two court‑appointed psychiatrists found Townsel competent (concluding malingering). At trial defense psychologist Dr. Christensen testified she had earlier found Townsel intellectually disabled and incompetent based on an October 1989 hospital evaluation.
- The trial court admitted Dr. Coleman’s rebuttal testimony, permitted lay school personnel and school records to rebut intellectual‑disability evidence, and instructed the jury with a modified CALJIC No. 3.32 limiting the use of mental‑defect evidence to determining the mental state for the murder counts.
- On appeal the California Supreme Court affirmed most convictions and the death sentence, reversed the conviction for attempting to dissuade a witness, vacated the witness‑killing special‑circumstance finding, and otherwise affirmed; key rulings concern competency procedures, admissibility of Dr. Coleman’s testimony and lay rebuttal, jury instructions on mental‑defect evidence, and Pitchess record issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Townsel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dr. Christensen’s trial testimony triggered a duty to suspend proceedings and appoint regional center director under §1369 (developmental‑disability competency) | Pretrial competency hearing and psychiatrists’ reports were sufficient; Dr. Christensen’s out‑of‑court, earlier opinion did not raise a bona fide doubt requiring new §1369 proceedings | Dr. Christensen’s October 1989 opinion that Townsel was intellectually disabled and incompetent required reinstitution of developmental‑disability competency proceedings and regional center evaluation | Court held no error: Christensen’s opinion was an outlier, confounded by hospital circumstances; no substantial evidence of present incompetence to trigger §1369 appointment. |
| Admissibility and scope of Dr. Lee Coleman’s rebuttal testimony criticizing psychological testing and expert inferences | Coleman was qualified to testify generally about limits of psychiatric/psychological testing in forensic settings; his testimony went to weight, not admissibility, of defense experts’ opinions | Coleman was unqualified on intellectual‑disability/testing issues, impermissibly testified on legal questions and discouraged jurors from crediting expert evidence | Court held admission proper: Coleman’s testimony attacked weight/reliability (proper rebuttal); defendant forfeited some specificity of objections; testimony was nonprejudicial. |
| Admission of lay school personnel and school‑record testimony rebutting intellectual‑disability evidence | Lay witnesses could legitimately rebut defense experts because intellectual disability would be noticeable to those who knew defendant; records and witnesses were admissible and cumulative to IQ evidence | Lay testimony and school psychologist’s record‑based conclusions were improper expert opinion/hearsay beyond common experience, prejudicial to core defense | Court held admission proper: lay opinions were rationally based on perception and helpful (Evid. Code §800); record testimony was at worst cumulative and nonprejudicial. |
| Jury instruction (modified CALJIC No. 3.32) limiting mental‑defect evidence "solely" to determining the mental state for the murder counts — did this preclude consideration for dissuading‑a‑witness and the witness‑killing special circumstance and for premeditation/deliberation? | Instruction adequately allowed jurors to consider mental‑defect evidence as to the mental states defined in the murder instructions (including premeditation/deliberation) | Instruction improperly limited jury to consider intellectual‑disability evidence only as to malice aforethought, excluding its use on dissuading/witness‑killing and on premeditation/deliberation; that limitation prejudiced those counts | Court held instruction prejudicially erroneous as to the dissuading count and witness‑killing special circumstance (reversed/vacated those findings); court concluded jurors could and should consider mental‑defect evidence on any mental‑state element including those required for the dissuading count; verdicts on other counts and penalty otherwise affirmed. |
| Lost Pitchess materials re: jail officer Reiland: adequacy of appellate record and prejudice | Trial court reviewed and disclosed one document; remaining records lost through no fault of parties; People argue no prejudice because aggravating evidence overwhelming | Defendant contends missing Pitchess file prevents meaningful appellate review of nondisclosure and thus may have affected penalty phase | Court found record inadequate to review what was reviewed in camera but applied Brown standard and concluded no reasonable possibility missing materials altered penalty outcome; no reversal of penalty. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Leonard, 40 Cal.4th 1370 (Cal. 2007) (failure to appoint regional center reversible only if it deprived defendant of fair competency trial)
- People v. Castro, 78 Cal.App.4th 1402 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (court reversed for failure to appoint regional center where psychiatrists failed to assess developmental disability)
- People v. Rogers, 39 Cal.4th 826 (Cal. 2006) (mental‑defect instruction construed to allow jurors to apply evidence to requisite mental states in murder instructions)
- People v. Smithey, 20 Cal.4th 936 (Cal. 1999) (upholding similar rebuttal testimony by Dr. Coleman attacking psychiatric evidence’s probative value)
- People v. Mooc, 26 Cal.4th 1216 (Cal. 2001) (trial court should make a record of documents examined in Pitchess in camera review to permit appellate review)
- People v. Brown, 46 Cal.3d 432 (Cal. 1988) (penalty‑phase state‑law error in capital cases reviewed for "reasonable possibility" of a more favorable outcome)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for federal constitutional error)
- Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (U.S. 1993) (conviction based on invalid instruction requires reversal because error is not subject to harmless‑error review)