2019 IL App (3d) 170370
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background:
- Defendant Roger Tondini was charged with three counts of aggravated battery for stabbing Amanda Delgado and asserted self-defense.
- He moved to qualify Marc MacYoung as an expert in "violence dynamics"; MacYoung testified he taught violence dynamics, had practical experience but no college degree or peer-reviewed foundation, admitted he could not speak to defendant's mindset or offer a self-defense opinion based on firsthand knowledge.
- The trial court denied qualification, finding the theory unrecognized, not peer reviewed, and not helpful to the trier of fact; a motion to reconsider was denied.
- During voir dire juror James Little disclosed his wife worked in the State's Attorney’s office and that he visited that office twice a month; the court asked and Little said he could be fair; defense moved to strike Little for cause and the court denied the motion.
- Defense used his final peremptory on a different juror (Harry Douglas), did not request an extra peremptory or further relief regarding Little, was convicted on two counts, moved for j.n.o.v. and a new trial asserting the two denials, and appealed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Challenge to juror for cause | State: No presumption of bias; Sandy Little (juror’s wife) is not a party; juror said he could be fair. | Tondini: Juror’s wife is a prosecutor’s office employee, attended trial, and juror’s frequent contact with the office creates presumed bias. | Court: No presumption—Sandy is not a party; defendant waived the claim by failing to preserve/request extra peremptory; no abuse of discretion. |
| Qualification of expert (MacYoung) | State: MacYoung would offer profile/generalized violence testimony untied to case specifics; Frye not implicated; testimony would not assist jury. | Tondini: MacYoung’s practical training/experience exceeds lay knowledge and would help evaluate violence context (number of people, alcohol, weapons). | Court: Denial affirmed—testimony was speculative/profile evidence not connected to case specifics and would not help jury; excluding him was not an abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Cole, 54 Ill. 2d 401 (1973) (certain juror-party relationships give rise to presumed bias)
- Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence)
- People v. Atherton, 406 Ill. App. 3d 598 (2010) (criteria for admitting nonscientific expert opinion)
- People v. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d 97 (2009) (expert admissibility requires knowledge beyond average layperson and assistance to jury)
- People v. Mertz, 218 Ill. 2d 1 (2005) (expert testimony admissible when it supplies jurors with knowledge they lack)
- Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432 (1992) (practical experience can qualify a witness as an expert)
- People v. Brown, 232 Ill. App. 3d 885 (1992) (profile testimony about general practices inadmissible when not tied to defendant’s circumstances)
- People v. Washington, 104 Ill. App. 3d 386 (1982) (failure to request extra peremptory challenge after denial of cause challenge waives claim)
- People v. Lake, 298 Ill. App. 3d 50 (1998) (reversal for failure to remove juror for cause only when defendant exhausted peremptory challenges and objectionable juror sat)