People v. Toloy
191 Cal. Rptr. 3d 801
Cal. Ct. App.2015Background
- Thomas Toloy, a Penal Code § 290 registrant for a 2001 sexual offense, was released from Monterey County jail on April 13, 2014 after serving >30 days for a parole violation.
- Toloy had registered with Salinas PD on January 7, 2014 and was informed then of the duty to reregister after any custodial term of 30 days or more; he had reregistered many times previously.
- There is no evidence Toloy was re-notified of the duty to reregister at his April 2014 release. He did not reregister within five working days and was arrested May 1, 2014; he admitted awareness of the reregistration requirement.
- He was charged with violating § 290.015 (failure to reregister), waived jury trial, and was convicted after a court trial; sentence to state prison.
- On appeal Toloy argued the § 290.017 release-notice requirement was not complied with and that noncompliance barred conviction; the Attorney General argued § 290.017 does not require notice at every release.
- The Court of Appeal held § 290.017 requires notice on each release but is directory rather than mandatory, so failure to give notice did not preclude conviction; judgment affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 290.017 require notice each time a registrant is released from confinement? | AG: The statute does not require repeated notifications on each subsequent release; limiting to initial notice is preferable. | Toloy: § 290.017 requires notification upon each release from confinement. | Held: § 290.017’s plain language and legislative history show notice is required on each release. |
| Does failure to provide the § 290.017 notice bar prosecution for failure to reregister under § 290.015? | AG: Failure to notify is not a defense; knowledge can be proven by other evidence. | Toloy: Noncompliance with § 290.017 should preclude conviction. | Held: § 290.017 is directory, not mandatory; lack of notice does not invalidate a prosecution where there is substantial evidence of actual knowledge. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.3d 474 (1979) (change in statutory language indicates changed meaning)
- Estate of Simpson, 43 Cal.2d 594 (1954) (wording changes presumed deliberate)
- Morris v. County of Marin, 18 Cal.3d 901 (1977) (directory vs. mandatory distinction explained)
- People v. McGee, 19 Cal.3d 948 (1977) (look to purpose to determine directory or mandatory effect)
- Edwards v. Steele, 25 Cal.3d 406 (1979) (noncompliance invalidates action only if statute intended)
- People v. Allen, 42 Cal.4th 91 (2007) (mandatory duty question is one of statutory interpretation)
- People v. Garcia, 25 Cal.4th 744 (2001) (conviction for § 290 violation requires actual knowledge; notice is evidence of knowledge)
- In re Young, 32 Cal.4th 900 (2004) (omission of language in similar statute suggests different legislative intent)