People v. Thompson
2017 COA 56
| Colo. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Aaron Thompson was indicted on numerous charges stemming from the disappearance and presumed death of his six‑year‑old daughter A.T. and abuse of other children in the household; jury convicted him on most counts and the court imposed a multi‑decade sentence.
- Thompson was indigent; private attorney David Lane had represented him pro bono for ~2 years and wished to continue, but requested state funding for ancillary services (investigators, experts).
- The trial court declined to depart from People v. Cardenas and therefore would not authorize state‑funded ancillary services for a defendant represented by private, pro bono counsel; the court appointed the public defender instead.
- Thompson argued the court’s action violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice (he claimed a forced choice between Lane and state‑funded services).
- The court also addressed separate challenges: statute‑of‑limitations for false reporting counts, numerous evidentiary rulings (hearsay, co‑conspirator and child‑hearsay statements, expert testimony, financial evidence), and imposition of consecutive misdemeanor sentences.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Thompson’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether indigent defendant has a constitutional right to be represented by private counsel who will represent for free and simultaneously require state‑funded ancillary services | State may limit provision of state‑funded ancillary services to defendants represented by public defenders (Cardenas); no Sixth Amendment violation where court followed that rule | Forcing defendant to accept public defender to obtain state‑funded investigators/experts deprived him of counsel of choice under Sixth Amendment | Court affirmed: no unconstitutional denial of counsel of choice; Ake, Caplin & Drysdale, and Gonzalez‑Lopez do not require that public funds pay for ancillary services for privately‑retained (even pro bono) counsel; any failure to consider Chief Justice Directive was harmless. (Majority opinion) |
| Whether false reporting and conspiracy counts were time‑barred by statute of limitations | Prosecution: offenses continued within limitations period by later false statements to police; thus timely | Thompson: initial false report occurred beyond 18‑month limitation, so counts barred | Held: convictions for false reporting and conspiracy upheld—prosecution proved misrepresentations within limitations period (e.g., shoe‑store identification; coordinated post‑report conduct). |
| Admissibility of out‑of‑court statements (Ms. Lowe, children, recordings) and confrontation challenges | Prosecution: statements were admissible under exceptions (statements against interest, co‑conspirator statements, child‑hearsay statute, residual exception); many were nontestimonial or otherwise reliable | Thompson: many hearsay and nontestimonial statements lacked indicia of reliability and/or violated Confrontation Clause; some expert testimony improperly vouched for child credibility | Held: trial court did not abuse discretion—findings supported reliability, statements admissible under applicable exceptions and Confrontation Clause principles; expert testimony was proper background/context (not vouching). |
| Sentencing: consecutive maximum misdemeanor jail terms imposed before prison term | People: consecutive county jail sentences for multiple misdemeanor child‑abuse victims were warranted given severity; statutory exception permitted consecutive misdemeanor before prison after considering factors | Thompson: court failed to justify consecutive misdemeanor sentences and improperly ordered them to run prior to prison sentence | Held: no abuse of discretion—court cited offense seriousness and statutory authority to impose consecutive misdemeanor sentences before prison term. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gonzalez‑Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (right to counsel of choice is constitutionally protected)
- Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person’s money for counsel/services)
- Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (state must provide essential psychiatric assistance when sanity is significant; does not require funds to hire defendant’s own expert)
- Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (one constitutional right should not be surrendered to assert another — narrow, fact‑specific rule)
- People v. Cardenas, 62 P.3d 621 (Colo. 2002) (Colorado interpretation: state‑funded ancillary services available only if defendant is represented by public defender or appointed counsel)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause limits admission of testimonial statements)
- Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (co‑conspirator statements in furtherance of conspiracy are nontestimonial for confrontation purposes)
- McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (limits on extending Simmons rationale; courts may require difficult choices without necessarily invalidating them)
