People v. Thompson
2016 IL 118667
| Ill. | 2016Background
- Jeremy Thompson was indicted for procuring and tampering with anhydrous ammonia used to make methamphetamine after surveillance footage from Hamson Ag (July 21, 2011) showed a man stealing from tanks.
- The State played the surveillance video and introduced still images; four witnesses (two Hamilton County/Mt. Vernon officers, one Mt. Vernon officer, and a civilian, Jessica Joslin) testified they identified Thompson from the images/video.
- At a pretrial motion, the circuit court allowed lay-opinion identification testimony under Illinois Rule of Evidence 701; the jury convicted Thompson on both counts.
- The appellate court reversed, relying on People v. Starks, concluding the lay identifications improperly invaded the jury’s fact-finding because the witnesses offered no perspective superior to the jury’s.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted review, articulated a totality-of-the-circumstances Rule 701 standard for lay identification testimony (rejecting Starks), evaluated each witness’s testimony, and held the erroneous admission of some officer testimony harmless given Thompson’s admissions to police and other evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Thompson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether lay-opinion identification from witnesses of a person in surveillance footage is admissible under Ill. R. Evid. 701 | Rule 701 allows lay-opinion ID if testimony is rationally based on perception and helpful to determining identity; courts should admit when a witness is more likely than the jury to identify the defendant | Lay identification testimony invaded the jury’s province where witnesses had no superior vantage or special familiarity; admission prejudiced the verdict | Admissible under Rule 701 when (1) rationally based on perception and (2) helpful — i.e., there is some basis that the witness is more likely than the jury to identify the defendant. Use a totality-of-the-circumstances test; reject Starks’ two-part test. |
| Whether law-enforcement witnesses should be categorically barred from or treated differently when offering lay-opinion identification | The State: no per se bar; officers may testify if their familiarity gives them an identificatory perspective; safeguards can address potential prejudice | Thompson: law-enforcement ID testimony is inherently prejudicial (bias, relationship, or revealing prior convictions) and should be prohibited or strictly limited | No per se bar. Court requires precautionary procedures (e.g., voir dire/examination outside jury presence about familiarity/bias; limit testimony about officer’s relationship to custodial facts; juror instructions about weight). Trial courts should balance probative value vs. prejudice under Rule 403. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Starks, 119 Ill. App. 3d 21 (Ill. App. 1983) (Illinois appellate decision relied on below; imposed a narrower two-part test for lay identification)
- United States v. White, 639 F.3d 331 (7th Cir.) (identification testimony helpful where witness more likely than jury to correctly ID defendant)
- Beck v. United States, 418 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir.) (Rule 701 analysis: opinion must be rationally based and helpful; totality of circumstances approach)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (U.S. 1986) (limits on confrontation arise when cross-examination is prohibited; permissive cross-examination avoids per se exclusion)
- United States v. Calhoun, 544 F.2d 291 (6th Cir.) (disapproved by the Court — held admission of parole officer ID was per se abuse because of confrontation/cross-examination concerns)