People v. Thomas, 523 P.3d 323

Background

In 1992 Justin Heath Thomas was charged in Riverside County with first‑degree murder for killing Rafael Noriega; jury found true robbery‑murder special circumstance and a prior‑murder special circumstance based on a Texas conviction (for the 1995 killing of Regina Hartwell) and returned a death verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Key evidence: eyewitness Dorothy Brown saw Thomas shoot Noriega after Noriega retrieved a green duffel; Brown and other witnesses later tied Thomas to taking drugs from Noriega and to admissions that he had shot someone in California for drugs. Brown’s Texas trial testimony (she later died) was read at the California trial.
The prosecution introduced detailed evidence of Hartwell’s murder (Texas conviction) and other violent threats/incidents to prove motive, intent, and common behavioral pattern; defense vigorously attacked witness credibility and challenged admission as unduly prejudicial under Evid. Code §§ 1101, 352.
Thomas represented himself for a period; he made repeated funding requests for investigative and mitigation work that the court partially denied as vague under § 987.9; he later sought to represent himself again at the penalty phase, which the trial court denied as untimely.
At penalty deliberations the jury briefly reported a deadlock (11–1), the court polled jurors about whether further deliberation could be productive, ordered further deliberations, recessing over the holidays; jury later returned a death verdict. Thomas challenged that direction as coercive.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Adequacy of court funding while Thomas represented himself / effect on Faretta right	Court properly exercised discretion under § 987.9; defendant had access to substantial funds and requests were vague	Court denied reasonably necessary funds, effectively forcing Thomas to abandon self‑representation in violation of Sixth and state constitutions	No abuse of discretion; requests were vague, court approved substantial funds overall, no constructive denial of Faretta rights
Admission of evidence of Hartwell murder (other‑acts evidence under Evid. Code § 1101(b) and § 352)	Evidence was admissible to show motive, intent, plan, and absence of mistake; probative value outweighed prejudice	Evidence was inflammatory, cumulative, and unduly prejudicial; should have been excluded	No abuse of discretion: other‑acts evidence relevant to motive/intent and corroborated; jury received limiting instruction; admission not unduly prejudicial under § 352
Admission of Brown’s Texas testimony under Evid. Code § 1291 / confrontation concerns	Brown unavailable; prior trial cross‑examination in Texas gave defense similar motive and interest to impeach — testimony admissible	Cross‑examination motive in Texas differed; admission violated confrontation and due process	No abuse of discretion: defense interest/motive in Texas was sufficiently similar; constitutional claims fail when state law admission proper
Sufficiency of evidence for robbery‑murder special circumstance	Evidence that Thomas took a duffel/bag of drugs after shooting Noriega supports independent felonious purpose to rob	Murder motive was to silence an alleged informant (not robbery); robbery incidental	Sufficient evidence: timing (Noriega produced bag then was shot and Thomas took it) permitted a reasonable jury to infer concurrent intent to rob
Validity/use of Texas murder conviction to support prior‑murder special circumstance	Prior Texas conviction satisfies § 190.2(a)(2) if offense equals first/second‑degree murder in CA	Texas conviction may have been for a theory not equivalent to CA implied‑malice murder; thus cannot support special circumstance	Court did not reverse because any error would be harmless: conviction admissible in aggravation and robbery‑murder special circumstance independently supports death verdict
Denial of late Faretta request for penalty phase and jury coercion by directing additional deliberations after reported deadlock	Trial court properly denied untimely Faretta motion after assessing Hardy factors; continued deliberations after brief deadlock were lawful and noncoercive	Denial violated right to self‑representation; requiring continued deliberation (and polling) coerced jury to return death verdict	Faretta denial not an abuse of discretion (untimely; factors weighed against); ordering further deliberations and polling jurors was within discretion and not coercive under § 1140 or federal due process

Key Cases Cited

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to self‑representation when knowingly and intelligently made)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing prescribed penalty must be found beyond reasonable doubt)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (capital‑sentencing factfinding must be by jury where it exposes defendant to death)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (facts increasing mandatory minimum are elements for jury)
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (in capital case, withholding lesser‑included instruction can be unconstitutional where it forces all‑or‑nothing choice)
People v. Demetrulias, 39 Cal.4th 1 (2006) (other‑acts evidence probative of motive need not depend on close similarity)
People v. Bryant, Smith & Wheeler, 60 Cal.4th 335 (2014) (standards for relevance and admissibility of evidence)
People v. Sandoval, 4 Cal.4th 155 (1992) (trial court discretion on continuation of deliberations under § 1140)
People v. Valdez, 32 Cal.4th 73 (2004) (limits on jury instructions for uncharged predicate felonies and other evidentiary rulings)
People v. Rogers, 39 Cal.4th 826 (2006) (instructional requirements regarding degree of murder and implied/express malice)
People v. Scully, 11 Cal.5th 542 (2021) (photograph admissibility and mercy/mitigation instruction principles)