People v. Thomas
2021 IL App (2d) 210103-U
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2021Background
- Marquis D. Thomas was convicted of the murder of Lavontaye Nunn; the trial court excluded incriminating statements by juvenile N.H. to chaplain Wayne Fricks (clergy-penitent privilege) and excluded an “I did it” statement to police in part.
- On direct appeal Thomas challenged exclusion of the police “I did it” statement but not the chaplain statements; this court affirmed the conviction (Thomas I).
- Thomas filed a postconviction petition alleging appellate counsel (Kim Fawcett) was ineffective for not appealing the exclusion of N.H.’s statements to Fricks; this court previously held the petition stated the gist of a claim and remanded (Thomas II).
- At a third-stage evidentiary hearing Fawcett testified he declined to raise the chaplain-privilege issue for strategic reasons: he believed N.H.’s statements would fail Chambers hearsay reliability factors, that raising them could undermine the “I did it” claim, and that reversal could open the door to admitting Thomas’s own statements to Fricks.
- The trial court found Fawcett’s testimony sincere but legally deficient and granted a new trial; it also found the new-witness testimony supporting an actual-innocence claim not credible.
- The appellate court reversed the grant of a new trial, holding Fawcett’s strategic choices reasonable under Strickland/Barnes and modifying the judgment to deny relief on the actual-innocence claim given the trial court’s adverse credibility findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Thomas) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not appealing exclusion of N.H.’s statements to chaplain (clergy-penitent privilege / Chambers issue) | Trial court erred: counsel’s failure was not deficient because his strategic reasons were reasonable | Fawcett should have appealed exclusion of Fricks testimony; failure was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial | Reversed: counsel’s decision was a reasonable strategic choice; no deficient performance |
| Whether defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s omission (i.e., entitlement to a new trial) | No prejudice; appellate counsel’s strategy was reasonable and rejection of the claim defeats prejudice | Admission of Fricks statements would have corroborated other confessions and probably altered the verdict | No prejudice finding needed after rejection of deficient-performance claim; new-trial grant reversed |
| Whether newly discovered evidence establishes actual innocence (testimony of Dismuke, Motton, Thurman) | Trial court reasonably discredited witnesses; evidence is not conclusive or reliable | New witness testimony shows N.H. was the shooter and would undermine the verdict | Modified: appellate court denied actual-innocence relief because trial court found witness testimony not credible/reliable |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (hearsay may be admissible when it bears adequate indicia of reliability and is critical to the defense)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (appellate counsel may, as a matter of professional judgment, refuse to press every nonfrivolous issue)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (voluntariness concerns where consent or acquiescence results from asserted authority)
- People v. Tenney, 205 Ill.2d 411 (2002) (discussing Chambers factors and hearsay reliability in Illinois)
- People v. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d 52 (2001) (statement not "against interest" if motivated by self-serving purpose)
- People v. Childress, 191 Ill.2d 168 (2000) (strategic trial-counsel decisions are not objectively unreasonable when reasonably based)