People v. Thomas
93 N.E.3d 664
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Christian Dior Thomas was indicted for armed robbery with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking; convicted at a January 2015 bench trial.
- At sentencing, the court applied the one-act/one-crime rule and proceeded on the aggravated vehicular hijacking count.
- The parties (prosecutor and defense counsel) believed pleas/offers would result in the defendant serving 85% of the sentence, but the trial court determined, based on the absence of a finding of great bodily harm, the correct rate was 50%.
- Defendant was sentenced to a total of 26 years (11 years plus a 15-year add-on) to be served at 50%.
- After sentencing, defendant sent a letter saying he might have accepted a 21-year plea if he had known time would be served at 50%, and sought posttrial relief; the court denied relief and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for advising plea outcomes would be served at 85% | State: counsel’s performance did not prejudice defendant; outcome would be unchanged | Thomas: counsel misinformed him about actual time to be served, so he "might have" accepted plea | No ineffective assistance — defendant failed to prove prejudice under Strickland (no reasonable probability of different result) |
| Whether the trial court was required to conduct a Krankel inquiry into ineffective-assistance claims | State: defendant’s posttrial letter did not present a clear/explicit claim against counsel | Thomas: his letter implicitly raised ineffective assistance by alleging misinformation about time-served | No Krankel inquiry required — the pro se letter did not clearly implicate counsel or assert ineffective assistance; it was reasonably read as post-hoc regret |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (U.S. 2012) (prejudice inquiry for lost/failed plea opportunities)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (U.S. 2012) (prejudice standard applied where counsel’s errors affect plea bargaining)
- People v. Hale, 996 N.E.2d 607 (Ill. 2013) (requirements for proving prejudice in plea-negotiation ineffective-assistance claims)
- People v. Powers, 961 N.E.2d 906 (Ill. App. 2011) (rejecting claim that counsel’s error about good-conduct credit prejudiced defendant where State would likely have adjusted offer)
- People v. Manning, 883 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. 2008) (distinguishing direct vs. collateral consequences and trial court’s obligation to ensure defendant understood direct consequences)
- People v. Correa, 485 N.E.2d 307 (Ill. 1985) (post-conviction ineffective-assistance discussion where affirmative misinformation about collateral consequence was given)
- People v. Frison, 851 N.E.2d 890 (Ill. App. 2006) (failure to advise about collateral consequences generally does not support ineffective-assistance relief)