People v. The North River Insurance Co., B271421

Background

Defendant Tae Ho Kim was arrested after police found large quantities of ecstasy, codeine, and marijuana; he signed a bail contract and a $100,000 surety bond was posted for his release.
Unknown to the surety, defendant fled the U.S. in mid‑July 2014 to Japan.
Defendant failed to appear for arraignment on August 20, 2014; the trial court forfeited the bond and mailed notice to the surety, triggering a 185‑day statutory appearance period.
The surety obtained a first court extension (treated as 178 days) and later sought a second short extension; the court granted a two‑day extension producing an appearance period that the trial court treated as ending October 13, 2015.
On the last day of the appearance period the surety moved to vacate the forfeiture, later supplementing its motion (after the period expired) to argue defendant was effectively "detained" (barred from reentry under federal immigration law) and thus entitled to vacatur under Penal Code §1305(d)/(e).
The trial court denied vacatur as untimely and on the merits (insufficient timely evidence; voluntary flight by defendant precluded relief); judgment for bond amount was entered and the surety appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) May a court grant a second extension of the appearance period more than 180 days after the first extension?	The People: statutory limit on total extensions (180 days from first extension) bars a later effective second extension beyond that 180‑day window.	Surety: court’s inconsistent orders/scheduling mistake and equitable relief under CCP §473(b) justify treating the second extension as effective.	Held: No; total extensions limited to 180 days from first extension order; subsequent extensions beyond that window are ineffective (Allegheny Casualty controlling).
2) May a court consider a theory and evidence not asserted/presented until after the appearance period expired?	The People: court may refuse; a surety must present theories and supporting evidence within the appearance period.	Surety: later‑acquired evidence and discovery rules justify submitting a new theory after the period.	Held: No; court may not grant vacatur on a theory not timely asserted or supported by evidence presented during the appearance period.
3) Does being barred from reentry under federal immigration law (because of drug charges) amount to "detention by...civil authorities" under §1305(d)/(e) when defendant voluntarily fled the U.S.?	Surety: reentry bar functions as detention and entitles surety to vacatur or tolling under §1305(d)/(e).	People: reentry bar here stems from defendant’s voluntary flight; relief is limited to restraints set in motion by authorities (e.g., deportation), not voluntary flight.	Held: No; voluntary flight that produces a reentry bar does not constitute "detention by military or civil authorities" under §1305(d)/(e); surety not entitled to vacatur.

Key Cases Cited

People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, 2 Cal.5th 35 (2016) (construes limits on appearance‑period extensions and surety rights)
People v. Wilcox, 53 Cal.2d 651 (1960) (standard of review and historical practice on vacatur)
County of Los Angeles v. Allegheny Casualty Co., 13 Cal.App.5th 580 (2017) (holding no 30‑day grace period for successive extensions beyond 180 days)
People v. United Bonding Ins. Co., 272 Cal.App.2d 441 (1969) (timely presentation of proof within appearance period required)
People v. Resolute Ins. Co., 46 Cal.App.3d 249 (1975) (relief limited to grounds properly set forth in timely motion)
Lexington Nat. Ins. Corp. v. People, 181 Cal.App.4th 1485 (2010) (permissible to seek relief under different subsection when underlying theory timely asserted)
People v. American Surety Ins. Co., 77 Cal.App.4th 1063 (2000) (deportation plus reentry bar can support vacatur)
County of Los Angeles v. Ranger Ins. Co., 61 Cal.App.4th 812 (1998) (voluntary flight does not warrant relief; extradition issues)