People v. Taylor
2016 IL App (1st) 141251
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- On December 20, 2010, Romaro Taylor shot Lashae Depratto after her car struck a parked vehicle carrying Taylor’s seven‑year‑old daughter; Depratto was wounded and identified Taylor as the shooter.
- Taylor was arrested in September 2011 and convicted at a 2014 jury trial of attempted first‑degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm (the convictions were merged for sentencing).
- At trial Taylor requested a defense‑of‑others instruction; the court refused, finding the danger had subsided after Depratto’s car stopped and was inoperable.
- At sentencing the court classified attempted murder as Class X and imposed 36 years; Taylor sought Class 1 sentencing under 720 ILCS 5/8‑4(c)(1)(E) (sudden & intense passion from serious provocation).
- Taylor also contested several court fees as ex post facto impositions; the appellate court vacated a $2 Public Defender Records Automation Fee (inapplicable because Taylor had private counsel) but otherwise rejected the fee challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court erred by refusing a defense‑of‑others jury instruction | The State: evidence did not support defense‑of‑others because danger had ended once the car stopped | Taylor: slight evidence supported defense‑of‑others; he believed Depratto posed imminent danger to his child | Court affirmed: no abuse of discretion in refusing instruction—vehicle was inoperable, threat had subsided, Taylor’s speculative view unsupported (no testimony from Taylor) |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting an instruction that unreasonable belief in defense negates attempted murder | State: no showing counsel’s omission prejudiced outcome; court did not err in rejecting defense instruction | Taylor: counsel should have requested instruction that imperfect self‑defense precludes attempted first‑degree murder | Denied: court found no basis for defense instruction (no evidence of defense of others), so ineffective‑assistance claim fails |
| Whether sentencing should be Class 1 under 8‑4(c)(1)(E) (sudden & intense passion from serious provocation) | State: statute can apply to transferred intent scenarios; but trial court misinterpreted the statute | Taylor: statute permits reduction where provocation and intense passion are shown; here his conduct was provoked | Reversed on statutory interpretation and sentencing facts: appellate court held trial court misread statute and abused discretion in finding no sudden/intense passion; remanded for resentencing and factual finding on provocation |
| Whether post‑2010 automation and other fees violate ex post facto or were improperly imposed | State: automation fees are compensatory not punitive and thus not ex post facto; court services fee properly authorized | Taylor: fees enacted after offense violate ex post facto; some fees inapplicable to him | Mostly denied: ex post facto challenge rejected; $2 Public Defender Records Automation Fee vacated (Taylor had private counsel); other fees affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d 238 (1983) (Illinois does not recognize attempted voluntary manslaughter as a separate offense)
- People v. Lockett, 82 Ill. 2d 546 (1980) (trial court must determine whether any evidence supports subjective belief in need to use force)
- People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916 (2015) (sentence nonconformity rule clarified and earlier rule abrogated)
- People v. Dalton, 406 Ill. App. 3d 158 (2010) (automation fees are compensatory rather than punitive)
- People v. Rivera, 2013 IL 112476 (2013) (standard for abuse of discretion in sentencing)
- People v. Garcia, 165 Ill. 2d 409 (1995) (passion only mitigates murder liability if provocation is legally sufficient)
- People v. Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3d 683 (1995) (attempted murder requires specific intent to kill)