People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People
352 P.3d 959
Colo.2015Background
- Between 1990 and 2006 Colorado law mandated life without parole (LWOP) for class 1 felonies; before 1990 and after 2006 life meant parole eligibility after 40 years (LWPP) for juveniles.
- Tate (16) and Banks (15) were convicted of class 1 felonies in 2004 and sentenced to mandatory LWOP; their appeals were pending when Miller v. Alabama was decided.
- Miller held mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional and required individualized consideration of youth and attendant characteristics before imposing LWOP.
- The Colorado Supreme Court held Miller made the 1990–2006 mandatory scheme unconstitutional as applied to juveniles and addressed the proper remedy in the absence of legislative change.
- Jensen was sentenced to mandatory LWOP in 1998; his conviction was final and he sought collateral relief after Miller. The court considered whether Miller applies retroactively.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper remedy for juvenile defendants given mandatory LWOP under Colorado's 1990–2006 scheme | People: no need to remand; impose LWPP (parole possible after 40 years) now via severance or revival | Tate/Banks: Miller requires individualized resentencing; automatic LWPP is insufficient | Court: Vacate LWOP and remand for individualized Miller sentencing hearing to consider "youth and attendant characteristics." |
| If court finds LWOP unwarranted after individualized sentencing, what sentence should follow | People and Banks panel: impose LWPP automatically (via severance/revival theories) | Tate: automatic LWPP "goes further than Miller requires"; Banks argued severance exceeded authority | Court: If LWOP is unwarranted, LWPP (parole eligibility after 40 years) is the appropriate sentence in absence of legislative action. |
| Whether severance or revival can be used to rewrite statutes to impose LWPP without remand | People: severance or revival can cure statute to effect LWPP | Banks: severance improper; courts exceeded authority | Court: neither severance nor revival applies here; remedy is remand for individualized determination, then LWPP if LWOP unwarranted. |
| Retroactivity of Miller to cases on collateral review (Jensen) | Jensen: Miller should apply retroactively to vacate mandatory LWOP | People/State: Miller is procedural and not retroactive (AG conceded retroactivity but court not bound) | Court: Miller announces a procedural rule (requires a sentencing process) and is not retroactive on collateral review; affirmed denial of relief for Jensen. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; requires individualized consideration of youth)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (categorical bar on LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for juvenile offenders)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (procedural rules are generally not retroactive on collateral review)
- Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (courts should avoid nullifying more of a legislature's work than necessary)
- People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007) (remedy should reflect what legislature would have intended in light of constitutional holding)