People v. Swift, 67 N.E.3d 928

Background

Defendant Loren Swift was charged with one count of aggravated DUI under 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) for a August 17, 2012 collision that caused great bodily harm to Robert Miller; the indictment omitted the explicit language that the defendant’s driving was the proximate cause of the injuries.
At trial the State introduced evidence that cannabinoids were present in defendant’s urine; victim Miller testified he had pulled partially off the road to secure farm equipment and was struck by defendant’s Chevy TrailBlazer at the crest of a hill, sustaining severe injuries.
Defendant testified he momentarily looked away and reached for sandwiches; he admitted prior marijuana use but denied impairment at the time.
After the State’s first witness, defense counsel moved to dismiss the indictment as defective for failing to allege proximate cause; the trial court ordered the State to amend the indictment, deeming the change technical.
The jury was instructed that proximate cause was an element and defined it; the jury convicted Swift of aggravated DUI and the trial court sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment.
On appeal Swift argued the indictment was substantively deficient (omitted proximate cause) and alternatively that the State failed to prove proximate cause beyond a reasonable doubt because Miller’s conduct was an intervening cause.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Indictment omission of proximate cause	Omission was technical; "resulted in" conveys the element and amendment is permissible	Omission of proximate cause is a substantive defect requiring dismissal	Indictment was defective for omitting the element, but amendment was allowed because defendant failed to show prejudice after challenging during trial; conviction stands
Whether defect is formal or substantive	Phraseology was sufficient; not a material alteration	Omitting an essential element is substantive and broadens the indictment	Court: omission was substantive in nature, but remedy (dismissal) requires showing prejudice when challenged after trial commencement
Prejudice requirement / timing of challenge	No prejudice; defendant was aware of proximate-cause element from jury instructions and pretrial motions	Argues he need not show prejudice because indictment failed to strictly comply with Code when challenged during trial	Held that generally a defendant who challenges an indictment after trial begins must show prejudice; no prejudice shown here, so dismissal not warranted
Sufficiency of evidence on proximate cause (intervening act)	Evidence established foreseeability: stopped truck on narrow shoulder and driver inattention could proximately cause injury	Argues Miller’s decision to stop where he did was an unforeseeable intervening cause that broke causal chain	Held that a rational juror could find defendant’s driving was a proximate cause; foreseeability and causal link were for jury, so evidence was sufficient

Key Cases Cited

People v. Flores, 250 Ill. App. 3d 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (distinguishing formal vs. substantive defects in indictments)
People v. Milton, 309 Ill. App. 3d 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (indictment broadening principles)
People v. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245 (Ill. 1996) (prosecution may not substitute or amend grand-jury indictments without prescribed process)
People v. Cuadrado, 214 Ill. 2d 79 (Ill. 2005) (post-commencement defects generally require showing prejudice unless unique prosecutorial misconduct)
People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23 (Ill. 1976) (indictment sufficient if it apprises accused with specificity to prepare a defense)
People v. Viar, 131 Ill. App. 2d 983 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (distinguishing total omission from imprecise allegation)
People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392 (Ill. 2006) (proximate cause entails cause-in-fact and foreseeability/legal cause)
Mack v. Ford Motor Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (intervening acts and foreseeability in breaking causal chain)