People v. Swenson
124 N.E.3d 1055
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- On Dec. 7, 2015, Rory John Swenson left a voicemail for Keith Country Day School about admissions; on return call he asked a school director numerous questions about guns, lockdowns, bulletproof windows, police response time, and made graphic remarks about shooting children. The call lasted ~15–20 minutes and left the director "shook up," prompting a soft lockdown and police response.
- Swenson was charged with attempted disorderly conduct (attempt to convey a threat), phone harassment, and disorderly conduct; phone-harassment count was later dismissed by the trial court.
- At bench trial, the director and a police officer testified; Swenson admitted making the call and said his purpose was to assess school security to enroll his son and denied threats or possession of weapons.
- The trial court acquitted Swenson of attempted threat but convicted him of disorderly conduct under 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(1), finding his manner unreasonable and that a reasonable person would be alarmed; sentenced to 12 months’ probation.
- Swenson appealed, arguing insufficiency of the evidence as to the required mens rea and that his speech was protected by the First Amendment. The appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Swenson’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence proved disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt (mens rea: knowingly) | The totality of the call showed Swenson knowingly acted unreasonably and knew or should have known his conduct would alarm/disturb the director and provoke a breach of the peace. | Swenson argued the State failed to prove he acted "knowingly"—i.e., consciously aware his conduct was practically certain to alarm or provoke a breach. | Affirmed: viewing evidence in light most favorable to State, a rational trier could find he knowingly acted unreasonably and knew or should have known his conduct would alarm/disturb. |
| Whether Swenson’s speech was protected by the First Amendment | The manner of expression (morbid, disturbing interrogation causing lockdown and police response) falls outside First Amendment protection for disorderly conduct. | Swenson contended his questions about school security were protected speech (not lewd, profane, fighting words, true threats). | Affirmed: speech expressed in an unreasonable manner that provokes breach of the peace is unprotected; his manner exceeded protected discourse. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Raby, 40 Ill.2d 392 (1968) (disorderly-conduct scienter: defendant must knowingly engage in unreasonable conduct and knew or should have known it would tend to disturb or alarm)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (establishes that speech is not absolute—e.g., falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater)
- City of Chicago v. Morris, 47 Ill.2d 226 (1970) (words expressed in an unreasonable manner that provoke breach of peace are not First Amendment protected)
- United States v. Woodard, 376 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1967) (speech may be unprotected when delivered in a manner that disrupts proceedings or public order)
- People v. Collins, 106 Ill.2d 237 (1985) (appellate standard: conviction will be upheld unless evidence is so improbable as to create reasonable doubt)