People v. Superior Court of Riverside County
4 Cal. App. 5th 410
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Leonard Rangel was originally sentenced as a "third striker" to 25 years-to-life for felony firearm possession and misdemeanors; resentenced under Prop. 36 to an aggregate nine-year prison term.
- Proposition 36 (Three Strikes Reform Act) provided a resentencing mechanism (Pen. Code § 1170.126) and was applied to Rangel; the People did not appeal the resentencing.
- Under the Postrelease Community Supervision Act (PCSA), most non-serious offenders released after Oct. 1, 2011, are subject to up to three years of community supervision (Pen. Code § 3451).
- At resentencing the trial court offered Rangel community supervision; Rangel declined and the court did not order it.
- The People sought extraordinary relief, arguing the trial court erred by declining to place Rangel on mandatory community supervision. Rangel argued he had excess post‑sentence custody credits that should offset or eliminate the community supervision term under equal protection principles and by analogy to Penal Code § 2900.5.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a prisoner resentenced under Prop. 36 must be placed on community supervision | People: Trial court must impose mandatory community supervision under §3451 | Rangel: He may apply excess post‑sentence custody credits to reduce/eliminate community supervision (equal protection; analogy to §2900.5) | Court: Mandatory community supervision applies; excess credits do not reduce/eliminate it |
| Whether §3451 allows application of excess custody credits like §2900.5 | People: §3451 is silent and mandatory; does not incorporate §2900.5 credit rule | Rangel: §2900.5 precedent should apply for parity with parolees | Court: §3451 does not provide for credits; §2900.5 distinct and inapplicable |
| Whether equal protection requires same treatment as parolees | People: Resentenced persons are not similarly situated to original §2900.5 parolees | Rangel: Denial of credit treats similarly situated persons differently | Court: Not similarly situated; legitimate differences and voter/legislative choices justify different treatment |
| Effect of People v. Morales on Prop. 36 resentencing | People: Morales controls and forecloses credit claim | Rangel: Distinguished? (argued similarity) | Court: Morales governs; its reasoning mandates denying credit application to community supervision |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Morales, 63 Cal.4th 399 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (excess custody credits under §2900.5 do not reduce parole imposed on resentencing under Proposition 47)
- People v. Russo, 25 Cal.4th 1124 (2001) (limits on citing unpublished opinions; interpretation of rule regarding same "criminal or disciplinary action")
- In re Rojas, 23 Cal.3d 152 (1979) (purpose of §2900.5 to equalize treatment of defendants unable to post bail)
- People v. Thomas, 21 Cal.4th 1122 (1999) (three strikes defendants entitled to presentence custody credits under §§2900.5 and 4019)
- Cooley v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.4th 228 (2002) (equal protection principle: similarly situated persons should receive like treatment)