People v. Suarez
F070210
| Cal. Ct. App. | Dec 4, 2017Background
- At 15, Ryan Suarez was charged and tried as an adult for first degree murder of 15‑year‑old John Cordero; jury convicted and found firearm and gang enhancements true; aggregate sentence 50 years to life.
- Prosecution theory: gang retaliation—Suarez alleged Norteño member shot Cordero, a Sureño, in a park after approaching him, pulling a gun, and firing while Cordero fled and lay wounded; eyewitness and video evidence tied Suarez to the scene; shell casings matched a single Glock and ammunition recovered from Suarez’s residence matched crime‑scene casings.
- Defense theory: heat of passion/imperfect self‑defense; trial court gave CALCRIM instructions on first degree murder and on heat of passion manslaughter (on defense request); no testimony established provocative words or physical provocation by victim.
- The People introduced gang evidence and expert testimony to prove motive and the section 186.22(b) gang enhancement; trial court limited (sanitized) particularly prejudicial prior‑act references under Evidence Code §352.
- On appeal Suarez raised: insufficiency of evidence of deliberation/premeditation; failure to instruct sua sponte on subjective provocation; error in manslaughter instruction re: considering youth; improper gang evidence admission; cumulative error; Eighth Amendment challenge to his lengthy sentence under Miller; and argued Proposition 57 should apply retroactively to entitle him to a fitness/transfer hearing.
- Court affirmed conviction, ordered limited remand under People v. Franklin to allow record development for future youth‑offender parole consideration and to permit the trial court to exercise discretion under Senate Bill 620 to strike firearm enhancements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Suarez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence of premeditation/deliberation | Evidence (manner of killing, motive, gang context) supports first degree murder | Killing was impulsive/ rash; evidence insufficient for deliberation | Evidence sufficient; manner + gang motive permit inference of deliberation and premeditation (affirmed) |
| Sua sponte instruction on subjective provocation for second degree murder | No duty to give pinpoint instruction absent request; CALCRIM 521 adequately states law | Court had duty to instruct sua sponte that prosecution must disprove subjective provocation beyond reasonable doubt; CALCRIM 521 inadequate | No sua sponte duty; CALCRIM 521 correct and Rogers controls; forfeiture of request if not made; alternative ineffective assistance denied |
| Manslaughter instruction and youth consideration (CALCRIM 570) | Court properly gave standard instruction; defense could argue youth in closing; no prejudicial error | Instruction legally susceptible to excluding youth from objective "ordinary person" analysis; counsel ineffective for not requesting modification | Even if instruction ambiguous, no substantial evidence of provocation regardless of age; any error harmless; ineffective assistance claim rejected |
| Retroactivity of Proposition 57 (fitness hearings / direct file reversal) | Suarez: Prop 57 applies retroactively to direct‑file, nonfinal cases under Estrada and equal protection | People: Prop 57 is prospective as to transfer/filing provisions; Franklin does not compel retroactive fitness hearings; rational basis supports prospective application | Prop 57 not retroactive to cases already tried/convicted and pending on appeal; no equal protection violation; concurring/dissent would have applied Estrada and remanded conditionally |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (Cal. 2016) (Miller‑era youth‑offender parole hearing procedures; limited remand to develop record for Board)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencing must account for youth)
- People v. Rogers, 39 Cal.4th 826 (Cal. 2006) (subjective provocation instructions are pinpoint instructions; no sua sponte duty absent request)
- In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (Cal. 1965) (ameliorative penal statutes presumptively apply to nonfinal judgments when they lessen punishment)
- People v. Brown, 54 Cal.4th 314 (Cal. 2012) (limits on Estrada: its retroactivity presumption is narrow and applies where amendment mitigates punishment for a particular crime)