People v. Stull, 5 N.E.3d 328

Defendant Aaron P. Stull was convicted by a jury of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, with all four convictions and sentences running consecutively.
The acts allegedly occurred between August 25, 2009 and May 24, 2010, involving his then six-year-old daughter, E.S.
The State alleged three penetrative acts (mouth-on-sex-organ, penis-to-anus/sex-organ, penis-to-mouth) and one act of sexual conduct under 18, constituting aggravated criminal sexual abuse.
The State sought and obtained pretrial rulings admitting out-of-court statements and medical testimonies under sections 115-10 and 115-13 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to be used as hearsay evidence.
Defense challenged (a) whether aggravated criminal sexual abuse is a lesser-included offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, and (b) the trial court’s hearsay rulings admitting evidence from Brenham, Russell, Grieve, and Pearson; the court admitted the challenged evidence and proceeded to trial.
The appellate court affirmed, holding that (1) aggravated criminal sexual abuse is not a lesser-included offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, (2) the hearsay rulings were not an abuse of discretion, and (3) the overall evidentiary issues were harmless or within proper discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is aggravated criminal sexual abuse a lesser-included offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child?	Stull argues it is a lesser-included offense under the charging.	State contends the offenses have distinct elements.	No; not a lesser-included offense under abstract-elements approach.
Did the State violate the one-act, one-crime rule by charging four counts or by proof of multiple acts?	Stull asserts multiple convictions arising from the same act.	State treated acts as multiple distinct acts.	No; the State clearly distinguished separate acts and charged four counts.
Were the hearsay admissions under 115-10/115-13 admissible and reliable for trial?	Admission relied on improper hearsay from non-medical context.	Reliability and admissibility under 115-10/115-13 should be limited.	Yes; admissible under 115-10/115-13; reliability properly assessed at pretrial hearing.
Was the admission of prior consistent statements harmful, or harmless error?	Prior statements bolstered credibility of the victim’s account.	These statements could unduly influence the jury.	Harmless error; admissions did not prejudice the outcome; substantive under 115-10, not rehabilitative only.

People v. King, 66 Ill.2d 551 (1977) (one-act, one-crime rule and act-based analysis)
People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill.2d 183 (1996) (reaffirmed King, act vs. separate acts; framework for multiple convictions)
People v. Crespo, 203 Ill.2d 335 (2001) (need to differentiate acts in charging instrument for multiple convictions)
People v. Kolton, 219 Ill.2d 353 (2006) (lesser-included offense analysis under charging-instrument approach)
People v. Miller, 238 Ill.2d 161 (2010) (abstract elements approach controls when offenses are charged separately)
People v. Falaster, 173 Ill.2d 220 (1996) (115-13 admissibility of victim statements in medical context; balancing diagnosis/treatment)
People v. White, 198 Ill. App.3d 641 (1990) (liberal construction of 115-13 for medical diagnosis relevance)
People v. Rushing, 192 Ill. App.3d 444 (1989) (historical precedence for 115-13 admissibility)
People v. West, 158 Ill.2d 155 (1994) (reliability assessment for 115-10 hearings)