2012 COA 7
Colo. Ct. App.2012Background
- Defendant Joel Stovall pled guilty to felony first-degree murder with a predicate of escape, multiple attempted first-degree murders, and aggravated robbery, under a plea agreement in which the death penalty would not be sought for either brother.
- The underlying crime involved defendant and his brother firing at officers during a spree after a deputy was killed; the deputy’s death followed the brothers’ initial arrest for misdemeanors arising from a dog shooting.
- Sentences were consecutive, including life without parole for murder and lengthy terms for the attempted murders and aggravated robbery, totaling a cumulative sentence of life without parole plus 896 years.
- The prosecution appealed a restitution ruling; the appeal was dismissed as untimely and the conviction became final on January 2, 2004.
- Defendant later moved for postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(a) and 35(c); the trial court denied these motions, and the court of appeals affirmed.
- Defendant asserted several claims, including ineffective assistance of plea counsel and various time-bar and sentencing challenges, which the court addressed in turn.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of ineffective assistance challenges | Waiver in plea agreement bars postconviction claims. | Waiver does not bar challenges to whether plea was knowing and voluntary. | Defendant may raise ineffective-assistance challenges to knowing/voluntary plea despite waiver. |
| Ineffective assistance standard in plea context | Strickland standard applies; defendant must show deficient performance and prejudice. | Counsel failed to warn about predicate offense and failed to investigate. | Standard applied; no reversible prejudice shown for asserted failures. |
| Predicate offense for felony murder based on petty escape | Escape as predicate can be petty and still support felony murder; statute plain. | Petty escape cannot be a predicate for felony murder. | Petty escape can serve as predicate; no ineffective assistance shown. |
| Failure to investigate by plea counsel | Counsel should have reviewed autopsy, reports, and interviewed witnesses. | Non-disclosure prejudiced decision to plead guilty. | Insufficient showing of prejudice; speculative and unsupported. |
| Timeliness of Crim. P. 35(c) motion for non-class 1 felonies | Time-bar invalid for non-class 1 felonies; motion timely if excusable neglect. | Timeliness and tolling arguments toll the limitations period. | Untimely for non-class 1 felonies; no tolling; separate time limits apply per offense. |
| Legality of sentence with inconsistent findings of fact | Findings could support both specific and general intent due to multiple victims. | Cannot have both specific intent for some victims and general indifference for others. | No inconsistency; varying intent across separate victims is permissible; no error. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (plea forecloses most pre-plea claims, focus on voluntariness of plea)
- McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (standard for evaluating counsel’s effectiveness in plea negotiations)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice prong for guilty-plea ineffective assistance requires 'but for' test)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance)
- People v. Isham, 923 P.2d 190 (Colo. App. 1995) (plea waiver does not bar direct challenges to the adequacy of plea)
- People v. Wiedemer, 692 P.2d 327 (Colo. App. 1984) (mere self-serving postconviction testimony insufficient for prejudice)
- Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000) (plain-language statutory interpretation governs limits in 16-5-402)
- Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186 (Colo.2010) (plain-language interpretation; avoid implied exceptions)
- People v. Ambos, 51 P.3d 1070 (Colo. App. 2002) (tolling concepts for untimely postconviction motions)