2017 CO 80
Colo.2017Background
- Susan Stock, a hotel employee who lived in a single-room unit at the hotel, confessed to the hotel owner that she had stolen money from vending machines; the owner called police.
- A uniformed officer went to Stock’s room, knocked, and Stock’s father (a nonresident invited guest) answered, opened the door, and stepped back a few feet, allowing the officer to step inside the entry area.
- The officer asked to speak with Stock; she agreed, cleared a seat, and after a ~30-minute conversation admitted the theft and produced the vending-machine key.
- Stock moved to suppress her statements and evidence, arguing the officer’s entry was a warrantless home entry without her consent and that questioning was custodial without Miranda warnings; the trial court denied suppression.
- A Colorado court of appeals reversed, holding the father lacked authority to consent to entry; the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Colorado Supreme Court majority reversed the court of appeals, holding Stock effectively conferred on her father authority to permit the officer’s limited entry in her immediate presence; Justice Gabriel dissented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Stock) | Defendant's Argument (People) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officer’s entry into Stock’s hotel room violated the Fourth Amendment | Father lacked authority to consent because he did not reside in the room; Stock did not consent to initial entry | Father, an invited guest, had authority (or was authorized by Stock) to permit a limited entry; Stock did not object and then consented to speak | Court held father had authority to permit the officer’s limited entry in Stock’s immediate presence; suppression denial affirmed |
| Whether consent must be express vs. can be implied from context | Post-entry actions cannot retroactively validate an unlawful entry; no express prior authorization | Consent can be implied from circumstances (father’s gesture, Stock’s acquiescence, clearing a seat) | Court held consent may be implied from totality of circumstances and Stock’s conduct showed she authorized father to admit officer |
| Scope of permissible third‑party consent (limited entry vs full search) | Father had no authority to permit entry at all; especially not to permit searches | Even if no authority for full search, father could allow limited entry for conversation | Court limited its holding to a limited, a few‑steps entry for the purpose of speaking; did not decide authority for a full search |
| Reasonableness standard when officer knows third party is nonresident | Officer should not infer authority when third party is nonresident and resident is present | Prevailing social expectations and resident’s immediate presence permit reasonable inference of authority to admit | Court applied reasonableness, finding the officer’s limited entry reasonable given circumstances; Rodriguez apparent‑authority not necessary here |
Key Cases Cited
- Matlock v. United States, 415 U.S. 164 (third‑party consent valid where third party has common authority)
- Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (scope of consent measured by what reasonable person would understand)
- Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (search invalid if third party lacks authority to consent)
- Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (occupant’s express refusal bars consent of co‑occupant)
- Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (search reasonable when officer reasonably but mistakenly believes third party has authority)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (firm Fourth Amendment line at the home’s entrance)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (voluntariness of consent judged under totality of circumstances)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (limits on implied license and scope/purpose of lawful entry)
- United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (reasonableness depends on all surrounding circumstances)
- Petersen v. People, 939 P.2d 824 (Colo. 1997) (discussing authority conferred by express or implied delegation)