People v. Stevenson, 2023 IL App (3d) 220055

On August 13, 2018, Stevenson was arrested after a single-car accident and later released on bond.
On September 20, 2018 the State charged him with felony driving while license revoked (DWLR); a bench warrant issued and was served December 28, 2018.
Between March and August 2019 the State indicted Stevenson on five additional aggravated DUI counts arising from the same August 13, 2018 incident; Count V alleged BAC ≥ 0.16 and at least three prior similar violations.
Stevenson entered an open guilty plea to Count V on November 1, 2019.
He was sentenced May 10, 2021 to seven years’ imprisonment and two years’ mandatory supervised release (MSR); his motion to reconsider was denied July 16, 2021 after a change in law reducing Class 2 MSR from two years to one year became effective July 1, 2021.
On appeal Stevenson argued (1) a statutory speedy-trial violation based on the delay in filing the aggravated DUI charges and (2) entitlement to elect the reduced MSR because his motion to reconsider was pending when the law changed; he also asserted ineffective assistance related to these issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Statutory speedy-trial violation for delay in filing aggravated DUI charges	No violation: defendant made no written demand, so the 160‑day clock never began	Filing new charges ~1 year after initial indictment violated defendant's 160‑day statutory right	Affirmed: no plain error; record shows no effective demand so statutory period did not run and no speedy‑trial violation was shown
Right to elect reduced MSR where motion to reconsider was pending when law changed	Sentence was pronounced May 10, 2021 (before July 1 effective date), so new law cannot be applied	Because motion to reconsider was pending on July 1, 2021, defendant may elect the new, lower MSR	Affirmed: section 4 / precedent require the judgment to be pronounced after the law takes effect; motion to reconsider pending does not permit election of a law not in effect at sentencing
Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to preserve/safeguard these issues	Counsel was not ineffective because the underlying claims lacked merit and no prejudice resulted	Counsel performed deficiently by not raising the speedy‑trial demand or pressing for the new MSR	Affirmed: no prejudice—underlying speedy‑trial and MSR claims fail, so Strickland relief not available

People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551 (2007) (establishes two‑prong plain error doctrine)
People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121 (2013) (first step in plain error review is determining whether an error occurred)
People v. Garrett, 136 Ill. 2d 318 (1990) (160‑day speedy‑trial period for defendants on bail requires a written demand to start the clock)
People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191 (2003) (addressing speedy‑trial calculations when multiple related charges are involved)
People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100 (2013) (compulsory‑joinder rule ties related charges to the same speedy‑trial period)
People v. Lisle, 390 Ill. 327 (1945) (Statute on Statutes §4 does not permit sentencing under a law not in force at the time sentence was pronounced)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective‑assistance test)