People v. Stapinski, 40 N.E.3d 15

Police seized a Pakistan‑mailed package addressed to Stapinski that allegedly contained ketamine, then arranged a controlled delivery; Stapinski was detained, told he was not under arrest, and taken to the station to discuss cooperating.
At station meetings (with Sgt. Masterson, Postal Inspector Gunther, Stapinski’s attorney DeSalvo, and his mother present), officers told Stapinski cooperating would be in his best interests and would avoid charges; witnesses disputed whether the officers required assistance in four cases or only the arrests of two targets (Malcolm and Blair).
Stapinski cooperated in a controlled delivery; Malcolm and Blair were arrested and prosecuted. Stapinski continued limited informant activity but later ceased to be used by police.
More than a year later Masterson filed charges against Stapinski for possession with intent to deliver ketamine; Stapinski moved to dismiss asserting breach of a cooperation agreement and a due process violation.
The trial court found an oral cooperation agreement not to charge Stapinski for the ketamine offense (conditioned on his cooperation), concluded he performed, and dismissed the indictment; the appellate court reversed, ordering suppression proceedings instead. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s dismissal.

Issue	People’s Argument	Stapinski’s Argument	Held
Whether police can bind the State by a nonprosecution cooperation agreement	Police promises without prosecutor approval do not bind the State; refusal to dismiss; suppression may suffice	Police-made promise induced reliance and incrimination; validity of formal approval is not determinative of due process relief	Court enforced an unauthorized police promise on due process grounds when defendant detrimentally relied on it
Whether Stapinski suffered a prejudicial due process violation	Any misconduct could be remedied by suppressing incriminating statements	Stapinski fully performed and suffered more than statement‑based prejudice; suppression would not restore his pre‑cooperation position	Court held government conduct violated substantive due process and prejudiced Stapinski
Proper remedy for breach of a fully performed cooperation agreement	Dismissal was excessive; remedy should be suppression and further proceedings	Dismissal required to vindicate fairness and give benefit of the bargain	Court affirmed dismissal of the indictment as within trial court’s discretion
Standard of review for remedy decision	Legal questions (validity, suppression) reviewed de novo; remedy reviewed for abuse of discretion	Remedy decision rests with trial court if due process violation found	Court applied de novo to legal issues but affirmed that remedy (dismissal) review is for abuse of discretion and found no abuse

People v. Starks, 106 Ill. 2d 441 (Ill. 1985) (due process may require honoring government cooperation promises; dismissal appropriate for prejudicial government misconduct)
People v. Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d 449 (Ill. 1977) (trial court has inherent authority to dismiss indictment for denial of due process)
People v. Schmitt, 173 Ill. App. 3d 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (cooperation agreements must be enforced when defendant performed; remand to determine terms and relief)
People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (Ill. 1994) (due process implicated by oppressive, arbitrary, or unreasonable government conduct)
State v. Wacker, 688 N.W.2d 357 (Neb. 2004) (cooperation agreements are distinct from plea bargains; fairness may require enforcing promises)