People v. Spiller
2 Cal. App. 5th 1014
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Thomas Lee Spiller was serving an indeterminate 25-years-to-life third‑strike sentence (1998 conviction for smuggling/conspiracy) for offenses that were nonserious and nonviolent.
- In 2001 he was convicted of attempted murder and received an additional consecutive 45‑years‑to‑life term (a statutorily disqualifying "super strike").
- Voters passed Proposition 36 (Three Strikes Reform Act) in 2012, creating a resentencing procedure (Pen. Code, § 1170.126) for inmates serving third‑strike indeterminate life terms for nonserious/nonviolent felonies, subject to eligibility criteria including absence of certain prior convictions.
- Spiller petitioned in 2013 under § 1170.126 to recall his 1998 third‑strike sentence and be resentenced as a second‑strike offender.
- The superior court denied relief, ruling Spiller ineligible because his attempted murder conviction qualified as a "prior" disqualifying conviction.
- The Court of Appeal reversed: it held "prior conviction" under § 1170.126(e)(3) means a conviction that existed before the conviction resulting in the inmate’s third‑strike indeterminate life sentence; a later super‑strike conviction does not automatically bar statutory eligibility (though it may be considered under the § 1170.126(f) public‑safety inquiry).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a "prior conviction" under § 1170.126(e)(3) must predate the conviction that produced the third‑strike indeterminate life sentence, or only predate the court's decision on the resentencing petition | "Has" (present tense) in § 1170.126(e)(3) means the inmate must simply have the disqualifying conviction at the time the petition is decided; thus convictions obtained after the third‑strike conviction still bar resentencing | A "prior conviction" must have existed before the conviction that produced the third‑strike indeterminate life term; a later conviction (e.g., attempted murder) is not a disqualifying prior conviction for purposes of statutory eligibility | The court held "prior conviction" means a conviction occurring before the conviction that gave rise to the inmate's third‑strike indeterminate life sentence; a subsequent super‑strike conviction does not automatically render the inmate statutorily ineligible, though it may be considered under the § 1170.126(f) discretionary public‑safety determination. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Yearwood, 213 Cal.App.4th 161 (discusses Proposition 36 prospective effect on third‑strike sentencing)
- People v. Flood, 108 Cal.App.4th 504 (prior strike convictions must precede the current conviction under three‑strikes law)
- People v. Johnson, 61 Cal.4th 674 (interpreting resentencing eligibility and count‑by‑count approach under Prop. 36)
- People v. Berry, 235 Cal.App.4th 1417 (describing factors a court may consider under § 1170.126(f) public‑safety inquiry)