People v. Solis
232 Cal. App. 4th 1108
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Defendant Francisco Solis broke into his ex-girlfriend Judith M.'s home at night and stabbed her about 20 times with a screwdriver, causing life‑threatening injuries; he later confessed.
- Charged with attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (count 1), first‑degree burglary (count 2), and criminal threats (count 3); multiple sentence enhancements and prior strikes alleged.
- With prosecutor and defense agreement, the trial court instructed the jury on several lesser included and lesser related offenses as possible verdicts on the attempted murder count.
- Jury acquitted Solis of attempted murder and two lesser offenses, but convicted him of mayhem and assault with a deadly weapon (both submitted as lesser offenses of the attempted murder count); other convictions and enhancements were found true.
- Trial court denied Romero motion and imposed an aggregate sentence under Three Strikes; Solis appealed arguing multiple convictions from one charged offense were unauthorized and raised notice, separation‑of‑powers, section 654, and Romero/Eighth Amendment challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury may convict on two lesser related offenses from one charged count | Prosecutor: Parties agreed to submit lesser related offenses; jury verdicts permitted to reflect culpability | Solis: Section 1159 and related law do not permit multiple convictions for lesser related offenses; lacked notice | Court: Multiple convictions for lesser related offenses agreed to by parties are permissible; Eid reasoning applies to serve truth‑ascertainment function |
| Notice of multiple convictions (and Three Strikes consequence) | State: Charging and parties’ agreement provided adequate notice of offenses submitted | Solis: No notice of number of possible convictions; risk of harsher Three Strikes effect | Court: Defendant consented to instructions; Eid rejects need for notice of number of convictions; Vargas limits future Three Strikes use (one act cannot produce two prior‑strike counts for third‑strike status) |
| Separation of powers (prosecutorial charging discretion) | State: Prosecutor agreed to submit lesser related offenses; no intrusion on charging power | Solis: Allowing jury to create multiple crimes from one charge usurps prosecutorial function | Court: No separation‑of‑powers violation where prosecution agreed; Birks required party agreement to avoid that problem |
| Section 654 (multiple punishments/prosecutions for same act) | State: Section 654 bars successive prosecutions, not multiple convictions/sentencing within a single prosecution | Solis: Multiple convictions for same act barred | Court: Section 654 prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same act, not multiple verdicts in a single prosecution; no §654 violation here |
| Romero / proportionality of sentence | State: Trial court acted within discretion given violent offense and criminal history | Solis: Court abused discretion by refusing to strike remote prior strikes; sentence cruel and unusual | Court: Denial of Romero motion was not an abuse of discretion; sentence not grossly disproportionate |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Eid, 59 Cal.4th 650 (2014) (permits jury to convict on multiple lesser included offenses not included in one another to reflect culpability)
- People v. Vargas, 59 Cal.4th 635 (2014) (when two prior strikes arise from the same act, a court must dismiss one for Three Strikes purposes)
- People v. Birks, 19 Cal.4th 108 (1998) (overruled Geiger; lesser related offense instructions not mandatory—permitted only by agreement of parties)
- People v. Navarro, 40 Cal.4th 668 (2007) (limits appellate courts’ authority under specific statutes to substitute multiple lesser offenses for one greater offense)
- People v. Romero, 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996) (trial court retains discretion to dismiss prior strikes in the interest of justice)
- People v. Mancebo, 27 Cal.4th 735 (2002) (invalidating imposition of unpleaded sentencing circumstance; due process/pleading limits at sentencing)