People v. Smolley, 2018 IL App (3d) 150577

In 2004 Martize M. Smolley (age 15) was charged with first-degree murder (four counts) and unlawful possession of a firearm; he was automatically transferred to adult court under the Juvenile Court Act.
After a 2005 bench trial Smolley was convicted of two counts of felony murder and unlawful firearm possession; he received a mandatory natural-life sentence, which was later vacated following postconviction proceedings.
Smolley filed successive postconviction challenges; the State conceded his natural-life sentence was unconstitutional and a new sentencing hearing was ordered in 2015.
At the 2015 resentencing the trial court imposed consecutive terms totaling 65 years (de facto life); Smolley moved to reconsider and appealed.
While the appeal was pending, the legislature amended the Juvenile Court Act (raising the automatic-transfer age) and enacted a juvenile-specific sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105), and the Supreme Court issued controlling decisions on juvenile life sentences.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2016 amendment raising automatic-transfer age applies retroactively so Smolley is entitled to a discretionary transfer hearing	State: amendment applies retroactively to pending cases but not to cases already in the appellate court when the amendment took effect; juvenile court transfer not feasible because Smolley is now an adult	Smolley: amendment should apply retroactively to his case, entitling him to a discretionary transfer hearing in juvenile court	Denied. Amendment does not apply because Smolley’s trial ended long before the amendment and he is no longer within juvenile court jurisdiction (no discretionary transfer).
Whether Smolley’s 65-year de facto life sentence requires resentencing under juvenile-sentencing jurisprudence/statute	State: State conceded original natural-life sentence unconstitutional and agreed to resentencing; relies on sentencing court’s discretion at resentencing	Smolley: 65-year term is a de facto life sentence; sentencing court failed to consider youth-related mitigating factors required by Miller/Reyes and 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105	Held for Smolley. Sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing; trial court must consider youth and factors in 5-4.5-105 before imposing a de facto life term.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles; sentencing must account for youth).
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (life sentences for juveniles must be reserved for those with permanent incorrigibility; Miller applies retroactively).
People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (Illinois Supreme Court: Miller requires consideration of youth for discretionary life-equivalent sentences).
People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 (Illinois Supreme Court: juveniles cannot receive mandatory de facto life terms without consideration of youth; resentencing under 5-4.5-105).
People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729 (amendment to transfer statute is procedural and applies to pending cases).
People v. Hunter, 2017 IL 121306 (amendment to transfer statute does not apply to cases pending in appellate court at effective date; juvenile transfer not feasible when offender is beyond juvenile jurisdiction).
People v. Fiveash, 2015 IL 117669 (juvenile court lacks jurisdiction over persons 21 or older).
People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294 (remand required when record does not show sentencing court considered youth for de facto life term).
People v. Buffer, 2017 IL App (1st) 142931 (50-year term can be a de facto life sentence requiring Miller/Reyes analysis).