People v. Smith CA4/3, G059572

In 2006 Smith was convicted of multiple felonies and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 380 years plus; prior appeals followed.
In 2016 this court reversed the trial court’s denial of a section 1170.126 resentencing petition and remanded for the trial court to determine Smith’s eligibility for resentencing.
In 2019 Smith filed a habeas petition asserting, inter alia, that under People v. Vargas his multiple 1995 juvenile adjudications arose from a single act/victim and therefore constituted only one strike. Judge Tavill initially found Smith’s Vargas claim conclusory.
In July–August 2020 the trial court set a resentencing; Smith was not present. The court cited COVID-19 transportation restrictions and found “good cause” to proceed in his absence.
At resentencing Judge Uhler reconsidered the Vargas issue (with the prosecutor conceding the 1995 crimes were one incident), treated the case as a two-strike matter, imposed a determinate term of 42 years 4 months, but did not formally dismiss a strike.
On appeal this court held the trial court’s absence ruling violated Smith’s federal and state right to be present at a critical stage, reversed the resentencing, directed a new resentencing with Smith present (unless he validly waives), and instructed the trial court to dismiss one strike under Vargas on remand.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was it lawful to sentence Smith in absentia based on COVID-19 “good cause”?	AG: any error was harmless; COVID transport restrictions justified proceeding.	Smith: no waiver; constitutional right to be personally present at resentencing was violated.	Court: Presence right violated; reversal and remand for resentencing with Smith present unless he waives knowingly under §1193.
Could the trial court decide the Vargas claim on habeas and apply it at resentencing?	AG: trial court exceeded the limited remand or lacked authority.	Smith: trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Vargas claim and did so.	Court: trial court had jurisdiction; it properly addressed Vargas and the prosecutor conceded the 1995 incidents were one event.
Did the prior appellate remand preclude resentencing?	AG: remand only required threshold eligibility determination, not resentencing.	Smith: trial court acted within remit after finding eligibility.	Court: remand permitted the court to determine eligibility and then resentence; no error in resentencing itself (but presence error).
Must the trial court dismiss a prior strike under Vargas?	AG: contended some ambiguity about whether Vargas applied; cannot now retreat from concession.	Smith: Vargas requires dismissal of one of the strikes if priors arise from same act/victim.	Court: Trial court must formally dismiss one strike on remand per Vargas; appellate court will not impose a specific sentence.

People v. Vargas, 59 Cal.4th 635 (2014) (when multiple priors arise from the same act/victim they may count as a single strike)
People v. Cunningham, 61 Cal.4th 609 (2015) (a defendant’s waiver of the right to be present must be knowing and intelligent)
People v. Cutting, 42 Cal.App.5th 344 (2019) (resentencing is a critical stage; counsel’s representation can sometimes suffice to show waiver)
People v. Buycks, 5 Cal.5th 857 (2018) (appellate court should not substitute a new sentence on remand; sentencing discretion belongs to the trial court)
People v. Romero, 8 Cal.4th 728 (1994) (courts of appeal and superior courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate habeas corpus matters)