918 N.W.2d 718
Mich.2018Background
- Defendant (then a Michigan state senator) pleaded guilty to malicious destruction of property as part of a plea deal that included a 10‑month jail term, five years’ probation, a requirement to resign from the State Senate, and a prohibition on holding elective or appointed office during probation.
- At sentencing the trial court sua sponte struck the resignation and bar‑to‑office terms as violating separation of powers and public policy, but otherwise enforced the plea; the prosecutor moved to vacate the plea and to withdraw from the agreement and the trial court denied that motion.
- Defendant later resigned; the Court of Appeals initially dismissed as moot, then on remand upheld the trial court, holding both provisions unconstitutional under separation‑of‑powers and voters’ rights doctrines.
- The Michigan Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) whether the resignation term was moot and/or unconstitutional, (2) whether the bar‑to‑office term violated separation of powers or public policy, and (3) whether the prosecutor should have been allowed to withdraw under People v. Siebert.
- The Court: (a) held the resignation issue moot and vacated the Court of Appeals’ treatment of it; (b) held the bar‑to‑office provision void as against public policy (applying the Rumery balancing framework); and (c) held the trial court erred in refusing to permit the prosecutor to withdraw from the plea per Siebert.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of resignation provision | Prosecutor: term enforceable as negotiated | Smith: either moot (he later resigned) or unconstitutional imposition on legislative branch | Moot — Court declined to reach merits and vacated COA discussion of validity |
| Validity of bar‑to‑office term (public policy) | Prosecutor: plea bargains and charging discretion permit conditioning pleas to protect public; enforcement serves plea‑bargain stability and punishment | Smith: provision infringes voters’ rights and treats office as commodity; lacks nexus to charged conduct | Bar‑to‑office provision void as against public policy; should be analyzed under Rumery balancing and fails here (no close nexus) |
| Separation‑of‑powers challenge to bar‑to‑office | Prosecutor: no intrusion on legislative power because term is voluntary and revocable; houses remain sole judges of qualifications | Smith/COA: executive (prosecutor) cannot condition plea to expel or remove members—only Legislature may do so | Court resolved on public‑policy grounds (did not reach separation‑of‑powers for bar‑term), though noted separation concerns and left Rumery test as preferred framework |
| Prosecutor’s right to withdraw after court strikes terms (Siebert) | Prosecutor: entitled to withdraw when court refuses a material agreed term | Defendant: trial court may enforce remainder of plea to serve justice once many terms performed | Trial court erred: under Siebert prosecutor must be given opportunity to withdraw when court rejects material plea terms; remand for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Siebert, 450 Mich. 500 (Mich. 1995) (prosecutor entitled to withdraw when judge refuses agreed sentence or material plea term)
- Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1987) (balancing test for enforceability of agreements that waive public rights against public‑policy harms)
- Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991) (applied Rumery to invalidate a settlement term barring candidacy as contrary to voters’ interests)
- United States v. Richmond, 550 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (district court declined to enforce plea terms requiring resignation/withdrawal of a congressman)
- Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (U.S. 1969) (relevant on limits of legislative exclusion and qualifications for office)