People v. Smith, 206 N.E.3d 266

In 2000 defendant Calvin L. Smith (17 at the time) was convicted of first‑degree murder and armed robbery; jury found he personally discharged the firearm that caused the victim’s death.
Original aggregate sentence reached 86 years (including a firearm enhancement); after appeals and resentencing on the robbery count defendant’s aggregate became 65 years.
After multiple postconviction filings, the State conceded defendant’s 65‑year sentence was a de facto life term under Miller and its progeny; the court ordered a new sentencing hearing.
At the December 3, 2020 resentencing hearing the court imposed 6 years for armed robbery (consecutive) and 22 years for murder (two years above the 20‑year statutory minimum), citing deterrence and defendant’s role as the shooter.
Defendant moved to reconsider, arguing deterrence cannot be used as an aggravating factor for juvenile offenders and that his sentence violated Miller and the Illinois Constitution; the court denied the motion.
On appeal the Fourth District affirmed, holding sentencing courts may consider deterrence as an aggravating factor when sentencing juvenile offenders and that the court did not err here.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Smith)	Held
Whether a sentencing court may consider "deterrence of others" as an aggravating factor when imposing a discretionary sentence on someone who was a juvenile at the time of the offense	The Eighth Amendment and Miller line do not categorically bar consideration of deterrence for juveniles; sentencing courts retain discretion to weigh deterrence so long as youth and attendant characteristics can be considered	Deterrence is inapplicable to juvenile sentencing under Miller, Graham, Roper, and Montgomery because juveniles are less susceptible to deterrence; using it to increase a juvenile’s sentence is prohibited	Court held deterrence may be considered as an aggravating factor for juvenile offenders; its limited use here did not violate Miller or related precedent
Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by imposing 22 years (above the 20‑year statutory minimum) partly on deterrence grounds	The sentence was within discretion; deterrence was minor in weight and the court also relied on defendant being the shooter	The upward variance based in part on deterrence was an abuse of discretion and inconsistent with juvenile‑sentencing precedents	Court affirmed the 22‑year murder sentence, finding no legal bar to considering deterrence and no abuse of discretion given the circumstances

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (juvenile death penalty unconstitutional; juveniles less susceptible to deterrence)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders unconstitutional; limited deterrent effect)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencing must allow consideration of youth)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (Miller announced substantive rule retroactive on collateral review; only rare juveniles reflect permanent incorrigibility)
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (Eighth Amendment does not require a finding of permanent incorrigibility before discretionary life without parole; no specific factfinding required)
People v. McKinley, 176 N.E.3d 166 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020) (trial court gave improper weight to deterrence in juvenile sentencing)
People v. Haynie, 170 N.E.3d 1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020) (court weighed deterrence heavily in a de facto life juvenile sentence)