People v. Smith
55 N.E.3d 719
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- In March 2012 Peoria County indicted Rickey D. Smith on two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse; a Peoria arrest warrant was served on him in the Sangamon County jail on June 24, 2012.
- Smith was awaiting trial in Sangamon County on a separate charge; he was sentenced there on June 11, 2013 and remained in Sangamon custody for 31 days before transfer to the DOC on July 12, 2013.
- Peoria issued a habeas corpus ad prosequendum directing DOC to transport Smith; he was arraigned in Peoria on August 8, 2013 and trial was set for September 23, 2013 (later continued over Smith’s objection to October 28, 2013).
- Smith filed a speedy-trial motion on October 24, 2013; the trial court denied it, concluding the Interstate Detainer/IDA regime (160-day period with demand) applied.
- After a jury convicted Smith in December 2013, he appealed, arguing his statutory speedy-trial right (120 days) was violated; the appellate court considered the claim under the plain-error doctrine and reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which speedy-trial rule applies: 120-day custody provision (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a)) or 160-day IDA/103-5(b) demand rule via DOC custody? | State: once sentenced, Smith was committed to DOC so IDA/160-day rule applied and a demand was required. | Smith: he was not in DOC custody when Sangamon proceedings ended; Peoria custody (120-day rule) controls. | Court: Smith was in Peoria custody after Sangamon sentencing because Peoria had served a warrant while he was incarcerated; 103-5(a) 120-day rule applies. |
| When did the 120-day clock start? | State: implied that DOC/transfer issues delay or demand requirement affects timing. | Smith: clock began when Sangamon proceedings ended and he was held for Peoria (after the warrant served). | Court: 120-day clock began when Peoria custody attached on termination of Sangamon proceedings. |
| Was any delay attributable to defendant (i.e., did he agree to delays)? | State: argued custodial/administrative facts meant delay not Smith’s responsibility. | Smith: objected to continuances and was ready for trial; he did not cause the delay. | Court: Smith did not cause or agree to the delay; he objected to the continuance, so delay was the State’s and violated 120-day limit. |
| Remedy for violation | State: denial of dismissal (trial court previously denied motion). | Smith: dismissal of charges or other relief for statutory speedy-trial violation. | Court: error was plain and serious; reversed and remanded with directions to vacate denial and enter judgment dismissing charges. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109 (forfeiture by failure to raise an issue in posttrial motion)
- People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113 (plain error review requires first determining whether an error occurred)
- People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419 (burden for proving statutory speedy-trial violation)
- People v. Williams, 239 Ill. 2d 503 (distinguishable; addressed DOC commitment for presentence credit, not speedy trial)
- People v. Woodruff, 90 Ill. App. 3d 236 (defendant is committed to DOC for IDA purposes only when actually in DOC custody)
- People v. Wentlent, 109 Ill. App. 3d 291 (120-day clock for second-county charges begins only after first-county proceedings end and second county custody attaches)