People v. Simpson
392 P.3d 1207
| Colo. | 2017Background
- Officer observed erratic driving, detained William Simpson, smelled alcohol, and transported him to a hospital for medical attention.
- At the hospital, officer read Colorado’s Expressed Consent form informing Simpson that by driving in Colorado he had already consented to blood or breath testing and that refusal carried civil/evidentiary consequences; Simpson initialed the blood line and a nurse drew blood.
- Blood test showed BAC of 0.448; Simpson was charged with DUI and moved to suppress the blood evidence as an unconstitutional warrantless search, arguing his intoxication and the advisement rendered any consent involuntary.
- Trial court suppressed the blood result, finding the expressed-consent advisement and officer’s statements coercive and concluding consent was involuntary and no exigent-circumstances justification existed.
- The People appealed interlocutorily to the Colorado Supreme Court; the Court reviewed de novo the legal effect of the facts and considered whether statutory (expressed) consent satisfied the Fourth Amendment consent exception.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Colorado’s Expressed Consent Statute supplies valid consent under the Fourth Amendment for a warrantless blood draw | Statutory consent (driving in Colorado) satisfies the consent exception, so the blood draw was constitutional | The advisement and circumstances (intoxication) rendered any consent involuntary and coercive, so the search violated the Fourth Amendment | Held: Statutory/expressed consent by driving in Colorado satisfied the consent exception; blood draw constitutional; suppression reversed |
| Whether the trial court should assess voluntariness at the time of police interaction despite statutory consent | Prior statutory consent eliminates need to re-evaluate voluntariness at the hospital | Voluntariness must be assessed at point of contact; intoxication can vitiate consent | Held: Prior statutory consent obviates a separate voluntariness inquiry for purposes of Fourth Amendment consent exception |
| Whether Missouri v. McNeely or Schaufele limited validity of implied/expressed-consent blood draws | These cases do not invalidate statutory consent; they only reject a per se exigency rule | McNeely/Schaufele require careful scrutiny and may undermine warrantless blood draws absent exigency | Held: McNeely and Schaufele do not negate constitutionality of statutory consent; they only limit exigency theory |
| Whether Birchfield restricts implied-consent laws so they cannot justify warrantless blood draws | Birchfield upholds civil/evidentiary implied-consent schemes and does not foreclose statutory consent-based draws | Birchfield struck criminal penalties for refusal and questioned some implied-consent aspects | Held: Birchfield sanctions (rather than forbids) using implied/expressed-consent statutes to justify warrantless blood draws so long as penalties are civil/evidentiary, not criminal |
Key Cases Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (voluntariness of consent standard)
- Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (expectation of bodily privacy for invasive searches)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (no per se exigency rule for blood draws)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (upholding civil/evidentiary implied-consent schemes; criminalizing refusal to blood test invalid)
- People v. Schaufele, 325 P.3d 1060 (Colo. plurality on exigency and warrantless blood draws)
- People v. Magallanes-Aragon, 948 P.2d 528 (Colo. voluntariness/consent standard)