People v. Simpson, 25 N.E.3d 601

Marcel Simpson was convicted of first-degree murder for the May 8, 2006 beating death of Phillip Thomas; conviction relied on eyewitness and accomplice testimony plus a videotaped statement by Vonzell Franklin.
Franklin testified at trial that he could not recall the substance of prior statements, but the State introduced Franklin’s 2006 videotaped police statement in which Franklin relayed that Simpson had said he hit Thomas about 30 times with a bat.
The videotaped statement was used by the State as substantive evidence under 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(2) (prior inconsistent statements admissible if they “narrate, describe, or explain an event or condition of which the witness had personal knowledge”).
On appeal, the First District reversed, holding defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object because Franklin lacked personal knowledge of the beating itself and so the statement was inadmissible as substantive evidence.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed: it held the statute requires that the declarant personally perceived the events described (not merely the defendant’s admission), and that counsel’s failure to object was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial under Strickland, warranting a new trial.

Issue	State (Plaintiff) Argument	Simpson (Defendant) Argument	Held
Scope of “personal knowledge” in 115‑10.1(c)(2) — what counts as the “event”	The “event” is the defendant’s admission; witness need only have personal knowledge of hearing the admission.	The statute is ambiguous; the personal-knowledge requirement must apply to the underlying event (the crime) as well as the statement.	The Court held the witness must have actually perceived the events that are the subject of the statement (i.e., the crime), not merely have heard an admission.
Admissibility of Franklin’s videotaped statement as substantive evidence	The videotape was admissible under 115‑10.1(c)(2) and corroborated other evidence.	Franklin lacked personal knowledge of the beating; his videotaped relaying of Simpson’s alleged admission was therefore inadmissible as substantive evidence.	Franklin’s videotaped statement was inadmissible under §115‑10.1 because he did not personally perceive the beating.
Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the videotaped statement	No persuasive strategic reason to forgo the objection; admission would have been excluded if objected to.	Counsel may have had strategic reasons; the record must support both deficiency and prejudice.	Counsel’s failure to object was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial under Strickland; there is a reasonable probability of a different result, so reversal and new trial required.

People v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314 (discussing prior inconsistent statements and hearsay rule)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Ineffective assistance standard: performance and prejudice)
People v. McCarter, 385 Ill. App. 3d 919 (interpreting personal-knowledge requirement of §115-10.1)
People v. Wilson, 302 Ill. App. 3d 499 (same statutory interpretation)
People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215 (noted by State but did not resolve the personal-knowledge question)