People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162

In 2009 Cornelius Shinaul (age 17) pled guilty, per a negotiated plea, to one AUUW count; the State nolle prossed eight other felony counts; he received 24 months’ probation and completed the sentence.
In 2013 Shinaul filed a section 2-1401 petition to vacate his conviction after People v. Aguilar declared the AUUW subsection under which he pled facially unconstitutional and void. The State conceded the conviction should be vacated but moved to reinstate the previously nol-prossed counts.
The Cook County circuit court vacated the conviction and denied the State’s motion to reinstate, finding reinstatement would violate the one-act/one-crime doctrine.
The appellate court dismissed the State’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction; the Illinois Supreme Court granted leave, held the appeal was reviewable as a final order, and reached the merits.
The Supreme Court held the statute of limitations barred reinstatement of the nol-prossed charges and affirmed the circuit court judgment (although on different reasoning than the circuit court). Justice Theis dissented, arguing contract/frustration-of-purpose principles should permit reinstatement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Shinaul)	Held
Whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to review denial of the State’s motion to reinstate nol-prossed charges	The circuit court resolved all pending issues in a single final order; appeal is proper under article VI, §6 (and alternatively Rule 304(b)(3))	The circuit court’s order was nonappealable surplusage in a 2-1401 proceeding	Court: Appealable as a final judgment under article VI, §6; appellate court had jurisdiction
Whether, after vacatur of a conviction obtained by plea, the State may reinstate charges nolle prossed under that plea	The State may reinstate previously nol-prossed counts; tolling or equitable doctrines should permit prosecution despite elapsed limitations	Reinstatement is time-barred by the statute of limitations; defendant relied on vacatur and cannot be retried on time-barred counts	Court: Statute of limitations bars reinstatement; State may not reinstate the nol-prossed charges
Whether the statute of limitations tolls (or otherwise is tolled) when a plea-based nolle prosequi is later undone by collateral vacatur	Tolling or equitable protection should apply because the State reasonably relied on a final disposition and fairness favors tolling	Limitations protects defendants from stale prosecutions; no statutory or recognized common-law tolling applies here	Court: No statutory or applicable tolling; limitations must be construed to protect defendants, so it is an absolute bar

People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 (Illinois Supreme Court) (held AUUW subsection facially unconstitutional)
People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817 (Illinois Supreme Court) (discusses mechanisms to reinstate nol-prossed charges)
People v. McCutcheon, 68 Ill. 2d 101 (Ill. 1977) (State not bound by plea bargain when a condition of that agreement is invalidated)
People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872 (Illinois Supreme Court) (addresses voidness of AUUW subsection)
People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424 (Illinois Supreme Court) (on collateral attack to vacate convictions entered on guilty pleas)
People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 (Illinois Supreme Court) (plea agreements bind both State and defendant)
People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (Illinois Supreme Court) (vacatur of judgment restores parties to pre-judgment status)
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (U.S. Supreme Court) (principles governing plea bargains)
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (U.S. Supreme Court) (purposes of the statute of limitations in criminal cases)