People v. Seewald
499 Mich. 111
| Mich. | 2016Background
- Paul Seewald and Don Yowchuang, staffers on Congressman McCotter’s 2012 re-election campaign, discovered some nominating-petition forms lacked required circulator signatures the day before filing.
- Seewald and Yowchuang signed as circulators though they had not collected the signatures; the Board of State Canvassers later disqualified those signatures, preventing McCotter from qualifying for the ballot.
- Seewald was charged with nine counts of falsely signing petitions (misdemeanor) and one count of conspiracy to commit a legal act in an illegal manner (felony under MCL 750.157a(d)).
- The district court bound Seewald over; the circuit court quashed the felony information, concluding there was no agreement to commit a legal act. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
- The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave, considered whether an agreement to submit nominating petitions (a generally lawful act) could, when accomplished by false circulator signatures (illegal means), support a bindover under the statutory “legal act in an illegal manner” conspiracy theory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether probable cause exists to bind over Seewald on conspiracy to commit a legal act in an illegal manner (MCL 750.157a(d)) | Prosecutor: Submitting nominating petitions with valid signatures is a legal act generally; Seewald and Yowchuang agreed to achieve that end by falsely signing (illegal means) — satisfies the statute. | Seewald: Because the false signing invalidated the signatures by operation of law, there was no agreement to perform a legal act — only an agreement to do an illegal act; therefore statute inapplicable. | Held: The statute requires an agreement to perform an act legal in generic terms; probable cause existed to bind over for the felony conspiracy charge. |
| How to construe the phrase “legal act” in the conspiracy statute | Prosecutor: Read “legal act” as referring to the act’s generic lawfulness, not its lawfulness under the specific facts. | Seewald: Read “legal act” as requiring the act to be lawful as performed in the particular circumstances. | Held: Affirmed generic interpretation — “legal act” means lawful in general, not necessarily lawful as performed in the case-specific facts. |
| Whether construing “legal act” broadly would render the statute redundant or unconstitutional | Seewald: Broad reading collapses distinctions and lets prosecutors convert misdemeanors into felonies arbitrarily. | Prosecutor: Statute preserves distinct forms of conspiracy; prosecutors still must prove the agreement element. | Held: Statutory structure permits both forms; prosecutorial discretion exists but does not negate the statute; concerns insufficient to avoid ordinary reading. |
| Whether an impossibility defense compels a narrower reading of “legal act” | Seewald: (Implied) If completion was impossible because the means made the end unlawful, conspiracy to commit a legal act cannot stand. | Prosecutor: Impossibility jurisprudence (People v Thousand) supports reading elements by general legality, not factual impossibility. | Held: Court did not decide availability of impossibility defense but cited Thousand to support reading “legal act” generally. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Thousand, 465 Mich 149 (2001) (rejecting impossibility defense to attempt; statutory terms read by general unlawfulness rather than case-specific facts)
- People v. Duncan, 402 Mich 1 (1977) (conspiracy conviction under MCL 750.157a(d) — cited but did not decide scope of “legal act” language)
- People v. Asta, 337 Mich 590 (1953) (describing the gist of conspiracy as the illegal agreement)
- People v. Stone, 463 Mich 558 (2001) (standard of review for bindover decisions)
- People v. Ford, 417 Mich 66 (1982) (prosecutor’s charging discretion when a single act violates multiple statutes)