People v. Scott
2016 IL App (1st) 141456
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- In April 2013 two teenagers (Scott, age 16, and codefendant, age 15) robbed a woman in an alley, taking two backpacks; the victim reported one assailant pressed a gun to her temple. No firearm was recovered.
- Police responded to the call and shortly thereafter found two Black male teens about two blocks from the scene; officers detained them, conducted a showup, and the victim identified them; keys taken from Scott were identified by the victim.
- At a joint bench trial Scott was acquitted of the armed-robbery (firearm) count but convicted of aggravated robbery and unlawful restraint; the court sentenced him to five years’ incarceration and imposed an adult sentencing after a State motion.
- Scott argued on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to quash/arrest and suppress evidence (challenging the investigatory stop and attenuation of the confession), that his unlawful-restraint conviction violated one-act, one-crime, and that amendments to the Juvenile Court Act (Public Act 99-258) applied retroactively to preclude automatic transfer.
- The appellate court affirmed the aggravated-robbery conviction, vacated the unlawful-restraint conviction under the one-act/one-crime rule, and held Public Act 99-258 applied retroactively; it vacated Scott’s sentence and remanded for resentencing in juvenile court while permitting the State to seek discretionary transfer to adult court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was counsel ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion challenging the stop, ID, keys, and confession? | State: officers had reasonable suspicion from the victim’s description and defendants’ inconsistent answers supporting the stop and subsequent evidence. | Scott: stop lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion; evidence flowed from illegal detention so counsel should have moved to suppress. | Court declined to decide ineffectiveness—record was insufficient to evaluate whether a suppression motion would have succeeded (fact‑intensive stop/attenuation issues were underdeveloped). |
| Does the one-act, one-crime doctrine bar the unlawful-restraint conviction? | State: (implicitly) convictions proper. | Scott: unlawful restraint arose from same conduct as aggravated robbery and must be vacated. | Court vacated the unlawful-restraint conviction under one-act, one-crime and ordered a corrected mittimus. |
| Does Public Act 99-258 (amending automatic-transfer list) apply retroactively to Scott’s case? | State: argued prospective application (pointing to delayed effective date and some language elsewhere in the Act). | Scott: amendment is procedural and thus applies retroactively to cases pending on appeal. | Court applied Illinois Supreme Court precedent (Howard) and held the amendment to section 5-130 is procedural and retroactive; Scott was not eligible for automatic transfer. |
| What remedy follows retroactive application of Public Act 99-258 when juvenile was initially automatically transferred but later convicted of a non-automatic offense? | State: (did not argue on remand details) | Scott: a new transfer determination under juvenile-transfer factors is required because those factors are more detailed than adult-court retention factors. | Court vacated Scott’s adult sentence for aggravated robbery and remanded for resentencing in juvenile court, giving the State the opportunity to seek a discretionary transfer to adult court. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Bew, 228 Ill. 2d 122 (Illinois Supreme Court) (declining to reach ineffectiveness claims where record is inadequate to evaluate failure-to-suppress argument)
- People v. Millsap, 374 Ill. App. 3d 857 (Ill. App. Ct.) (refusing to adjudicate suppression-related ineffectiveness where circumstances of the stop were underdeveloped)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (reasonable‑articulable‑suspicion inquiry is fact‑intensive; totality of circumstances test)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (attenuation doctrine requires fact‑specific inquiry; no single factor is dispositive)