People v. Scott
3 Cal. App. 5th 1265
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- In 2009, at age 16, Javante Scott shot at three youths (one seriously injured); he admitted firing but denied intent to kill. He had gang-related associations and evidence of gang motive.
- A jury convicted Scott of three counts of attempted murder with firearm and gang enhancements and other firearm-related counts.
- In 2010 the trial court sentenced Scott to an aggregate term of 120 years to life — a de facto life-without-parole (LWOP) term for a juvenile nonhomicide offender.
- Following Supreme Court decisions (Graham/Caballero) and a habeas petition, the trial court vacated the sentence and held a resentencing; the Legislature enacted Penal Code §3051 during that interval providing youth offender parole hearings no later than 25 years.
- At resentencing the court reinstated the 120-years-to-life term based on §3051’s guaranteed youth offender parole review; Scott appealed claiming the sentence remained cruel and unusual.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the sentence, holding §3051 satisfies the constitutional requirement to provide a meaningful opportunity for release, but remanded to determine whether Scott had an adequate opportunity at sentencing to make the record required by People v. Franklin.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Scott’s 120‑year term is unconstitutional as a de facto LWOP for a juvenile nonhomicide offender | §3051 provides a guaranteed parole-review opportunity within 25 years, curing any Eighth Amendment defect | The trial court still must make individualized sentencing findings at resentencing under Graham/Miller/Caballero; §3051 does not substitute for that process | Held: §3051 satisfies Graham/Caballero’s central requirement (meaningful opportunity for release in life expectancy). Sentence affirmed. |
| Whether Miller/Caballero require individualized resentencing determinations in nonhomicide juvenile cases before imposing de facto LWOP | State: Miller’s individualized-sentencing mandate focused on homicide cases; §3051 implements Graham/Caballero’s remedy for nonhomicide offenders | Scott: Miller and Caballero require the sentencing court to consider youth-related mitigating factors when selecting any sentence that could be de facto LWOP | Held: Miller’s individualized procedure addresses juvenile homicide cases; for nonhomicide offenders §3051 is a constitutionally permissible legislative mechanism providing the required future parole opportunity. |
| Whether the trial court must allow the defendant to make a record relevant to future youth‑offender parole hearings | People: §3051 and related regs govern parole procedures; trial court reliance on statute is sufficient | Scott: He needed an opportunity at resentencing to develop a record for future Board review (per People v. Franklin) | Held: Court remanded for a limited purpose — determine if Scott was afforded the opportunity to make the Franklin record; if not, allow supplementation. |
| Whether §3051 is retroactively available to defendants already serving de facto LWOP terms | People: Legislature intended §3051 to cover existing de facto LWOP juvenile nonhomicide prisoners and Caballero urged such legislation | Scott: Argues procedural protections at sentencing remain required despite §3051 | Held: §3051 applies to offenders like Scott and constitutionally cures de facto LWOP sentences by guaranteeing parole-review within a juvenile’s expected lifetime. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (juvenile nonhomicide LWOP prohibited; State must provide meaningful opportunity for release)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider mitigating features of youth in homicide cases)
- People v. Caballero, 55 Cal.4th 262 (de facto LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders violates Eighth Amendment; Legislature urged to provide parole‑eligibility mechanism)
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (sentencing court must afford opportunity to develop record relevant to future youth‑offender parole hearings under §3051 and §4801)