People v. Saterfield, 2015 IL App (1st) 132355

In 2001 Saterfield pleaded guilty to home invasion and felony murder for a 1999 killing; he was sentenced to concurrent terms (60 and 30 years) and later pursued collateral relief without success.
On March 18, 2013 the clerk’s office stamped Saterfield’s pro se 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 petition "received"; it was stamped "filed" in a different court division on April 8, 2013.
The petition challenged the truth-in-sentencing law and the calculation of good-time credit as unconstitutional and sought a declaration that his sentence was void.
At an April 15, 2013 court call an assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) asked for time to review the petition and requested until April 26; on April 26 the trial court sua sponte dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit.
Saterfield moved for rehearing (arguing Laugharn), which was denied; he appealed, primarily contending the dismissal was premature because it occurred before the State’s 30-day response period expired.
The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) Saterfield forfeited arguments on the petition’s merits, (2) the record indicated the petition was received more than 30 days before dismissal or, alternatively, the State had actual notice and waived service/response time by not objecting.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Saterfield)	Held
Whether the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of a §2-1401 petition before the 30-day response period is premature under People v. Laugharn	The dismissal was proper because (a) the petition was "received" March 18 (over 30 days before dismissal), and (b) in any event the State had actual notice in court and did not object, waiving the 30-day period	Laugharn forecloses sua sponte dismissal before the State’s 30-day response period has run; dismissal on April 26 was premature because the petition was filed April 8 and only 18 days had passed	Affirmed. Court held dismissal was proper: record shows petition was received March 18 (so >30 days elapsed) and, alternatively, the State had actual notice in court and did not object, effectively waiving the 30-day period
Whether the truth-in-sentencing statute or the calculation of good-time credit rendered Saterfield’s sentence void or unconstitutional	The statute is constitutional as applied to offenses committed after June 19, 1998 (curative legislation corrected the earlier defect); the petition lacks merit	The truth-in-sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied and his credit calculation violated constitutional rights	Held the substantive claims fail. Saterfield’s crime occurred August 25, 1999, after the curative act; thus the statute is constitutional as applied and his good-time/credit claim lacks explained constitutional deprivation

People v. Laugharn, 233 Ill. 2d 318 (Ill. 2009) (trial court may sua sponte dismiss a §2-1401 petition only after the State’s 30-day period to answer has expired)
People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1 (Ill. 2007) (discusses circuit court authority to dismiss §2-1401 petitions and related procedures)
People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (Ill. 1998) (truth-in-sentencing statute initially violated single-subject rule but was cured by subsequent legislation, making it constitutional for offenses after the cure)
Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389 (Ill. 1983) (appellant bears burden to present a sufficiently complete record; doubts from incompleteness resolved against appellant)
People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309 (Ill. 2003) (a party cannot create or acquiesce in an error and then use that error as a basis for appeal)