People v. Sanders
34 N.E.3d 219
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- Defendant Derry Sanders (white) was tried and convicted by a jury of two counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(2)) and had previously pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance; he received consecutive prison terms.
- The alleged victim, B.J., drank heavily at a bar, left with defendant, went to his apartment, vomited, later awoke to find defendant having sex with her and reported the incident to police; defendant told police the encounter was consensual.
- The State moved in limine to exclude sexually suggestive text-message content between B.J. and another man (Lacomba) under Illinois’s rape‑shield statute; the trial court allowed testimony about contact, timing, and Lacomba’s observations but barred the explicit sexual content of the messages.
- During voir dire, the State used peremptory strikes against two apparent African‑American venire members; defense counsel lodged a Batson objection asserting a pattern of strikes against African‑Americans, which the trial court found insufficient to establish a prima facie case and declined to require race‑neutral reasons.
- At trial Lacomba testified he had texted and spoken with B.J. until about 4:30 a.m. and believed she did not appear intoxicated; the jury convicted on both sexual‑assault counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court improperly denied defendant’s Batson challenge | State: no prima facie showing; court correctly found no pattern or other circumstances to infer discrimination | Sanders: the strikes against the first two African‑American venire members required the court to find a prima facie case and ask for race‑neutral explanations | Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion; defendant failed to establish prima facie case and was afforded opportunity to present one |
| Whether the court erred in excluding the sexual content of B.J.’s text messages under the rape‑shield statute and Sixth Amendment confrontation concerns | State: messages are prejudicial, irrelevant to what defendant knew, and properly excluded to protect complainant | Sanders: messages show B.J.’s state of mind and cognitive ability to consent and third‑party perception (Lacomba) was relevant; exclusion violated confrontation or relevancy principles | Affirmed: exclusion upheld — the content was irrelevant to what defendant knew and would have been harassing/prejudicial; Lacomba could testify about communicative ability without explicit sexual content |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (established three‑step framework for peremptory‑strike discrimination claims)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (even a single discriminatory peremptory strike is forbidden; court must consider totality of circumstances)
- Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (prima facie Batson threshold requires facts permitting an inference of discrimination)
- People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227 (discusses Batson three‑step process and relevant factors)
- People v. Rivera, 221 Ill. 2d 481 (trial court’s prima facie Batson finding is a factual determination reviewed for manifest weight)
- People v. Davis, 231 Ill. 2d 349 (mere number of struck minority jurors, without more, will not establish a prima facie case)
- People v. Schuldt, 217 Ill. App. 3d 534 (evidence excluded by rape‑shield statute remains subject to relevancy review)
- People v. Cornes, 80 Ill. App. 3d 166 (confrontation and cross‑examination rights do not extend to irrelevant or collateral matters such as complainant’s prior sexual conduct)
