People v. Salgado
2016 IL App (1st) 133102
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- In January 2000 Paul Salgado fatally shot Julio Rodarte; Salgado later gave three consistent statements to police, including an emotional videotaped confession describing alcohol and PCP use that night.
- Salgado was charged with multiple counts of first-degree murder (both specific- and general-intent counts); the State nol-prossed the specific-intent counts the day before trial after defense counsel indicated a voluntary-intoxication theory.
- At a November 2002 bench trial the court admitted Salgado’s statements (finding he validly waived Miranda) and convicted him on three general-intent murder counts; he received 30 years plus a consecutive 25-year firearm enhancement.
- On direct appeal this court vacated and remanded for an attenuation hearing; the trial court later found the statements attenuated and reinstated the conviction, which this court affirmed on appeal.
- In 2011 Salgado filed a postconviction petition raising (1) ineffective assistance for trial counsel’s pursuit of a voluntary-intoxication theory for general-intent counts and appellate counsel’s failure to raise that claim, (2) a due-process claim that the State used allegedly false witness testimony (concerning promises to witness Navarro), and (3) that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to amend a pro se supplemental brief.
- The trial court dismissed the petition at the second stage; Salgado appealed and the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Salgado) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial counsel ineffective for pursuing voluntary-intoxication theory | Counsel’s use of intoxication evidence was a reasonable mitigation strategy; record shows vigorous defense (motions, cross-exam, challenge to suppression) | Trial counsel pursued an unavailable voluntary-intoxication defense for general-intent murder, conceded guilt, and thus failed to meaningfully test the prosecution (per se ineffective) | Denied — counsel’s strategy was reasonable mitigation; not per se ineffective; Strickland prejudice not shown |
| Appellate counsel ineffective for not raising trial counsel ineffectiveness | No prejudice because underlying trial counsel claim lacks merit; appellate counsel may omit meritless issues | Appellate counsel should have raised trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on appeal | Denied — appellate claim fails because trial-counsel claim lacks merit; omission not prejudicial |
| Due process violation based on alleged undisclosed deal with witness Navarro | State asserts no improper agreement; record shows Navarro implicated Salgado in Feb 2000 before any later bond reductions | Navarro testified falsely that no promises were made; later bond reductions for Navarro indicate a deal to secure his testimony | Denied — petitioner’s support is hearsay (Garcia affidavit) and speculative; bond reductions alone don’t prove a Brady/ Giglio-type deal; record rebuts claim |
| Postconviction counsel failed to provide reasonable assistance / comply with Rule 651(c) | Counsel adequately investigated, consulted with petitioner, and adopted pro se supplement after review; Rule 651(c) not applicable to retained counsel’s initial filing | Counsel unreasonably failed to amend pro se supplement or obtain affidavits from potential witnesses to bolster claims | Denied — reasonable assistance standard met; proposed affidavits would be hearsay/unhelpful and issues were meritless |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)
- People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115 (Post-Conviction Hearing Act overview and res judicata limits)
- People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688 (second-stage standard: accept well-pleaded facts not rebutted by record)
- People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1 (petition is frivolous/patently without merit when no arguable basis in fact or law)
- People v. Cihlar, 111 Ill. 2d 212 (when postconviction hearsay corroborated in record can justify evidentiary hearing)
- People v. Sanchez, 115 Ill. 2d 238 (capital-case considerations for hearsay affidavits and relief from judgment)