2019 IL App (1st) 160986-U
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- October 4, 2009: Bar owner Robert Gonzalez was found beaten outside his bar and died ~15 hours later; investigation pointed early to Raymond Jackson and later to Andrew Salamon.
- November 15, 2010: Salamon met detectives voluntarily, declined a polygraph and said he wanted an attorney; detectives told him he was free to leave.
- November 9–10, 2011: Salamon was arrested, handcuffed in an interview room for ~24 hours, repeatedly requested a phone call but was not permitted one before he reinitiated contact with detectives, was re‑Mirandized, and then gave statements to detectives and an ASA (one videotaped).
- At trial the State introduced Salamon’s videotaped confession plus witness testimony (a friend to whom Salamon confessed, an eyewitness who implicated him in a pre‑crime burglary plan), cell‑tower and alarm data, and medical testimony linking injuries to a narrow blunt instrument; Salamon was convicted of first‑degree murder, armed robbery, and burglary.
- Posttrial motion to suppress the inculpatory statement was denied; on appeal Salamon argued the statement was obtained after he invoked counsel and while he was denied statutory phone access, rendering the statement involuntary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Salamon’s post‑invocation statements were voluntary after he reinitiated contact | Salamon reinitiated contact, was re‑Mirandized, knowingly waived rights, and gave a voluntary statement | Initial invocation + ~24‑hour locked detention and pressure made any subsequent waiver involuntary | Court: Salamon reinitiated; officers re‑Mirandized; waiver and statement voluntary under totality of circumstances — suppression denied |
| Whether denial of telephone access violated section 103‑3 and rendered the statement involuntary | Delay in phone access alone did not vitiate voluntariness; phone policy was standard (booking before calls) and no proof of purposeful delay | Denial of reasonable phone access during prolonged incommunicado custody was coercive and violated 103‑3, making the confession involuntary | Court: Even if 103‑3 was implicated, denial is one factor under totality of circumstances and did not render the statement involuntary here |
| If statement were improperly admitted, whether error was harmless | Other evidence (confession to friend, eyewitness testimony, cell‑tower and alarm data, autopsy) overwhelmingly supports conviction | Erroneous admission of confession requires reversal because confessions are highly probative | Court: Any error would be harmless given cumulative and overwhelming properly admitted evidence; conviction affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda warnings and right to counsel)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (post‑invocation interrogation prohibited unless suspect reinitiates)
- Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (U.S. 1963) (incommunicado detention can render confession involuntary)
- J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (U.S. 2011) (custodial interviews have coercive aspects relevant to voluntariness)
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (U.S. 1996) (bifurcated standard of review for suppression rulings)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (U.S. 1991) (harmless‑error framework for coerced/confession issues)
- People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104 (Ill. 2005) (totality‑of‑circumstances test for voluntariness)
- People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382 (Ill. 1995) (once invoked, right to counsel bars further interrogation absent waiver or reinitiation)
- People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860 (Ill. 2012) (distinguishing physical coercion and applying harmless‑error analysis)