2022 IL App (2d) 200119
Ill. App. Ct.2022Background:
- In the early morning of July 2, 2017, Carl R. Russell shot Eric Peterson outside Russell’s garage; the wound caused catastrophic brain and bodily injuries (loss of right eye, paralysis, cognitive deficits).
- Russell was indicted on multiple counts (including four counts of attempt—first‑degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated battery, and aggravated discharge of a firearm); jury convicted on all counts and findings showed he personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily harm.
- Trial: Russell asserted justifiable use of force in defense of a person and defense of a dwelling; the court declined a defense‑of‑dwelling instruction; defense did not request an imperfect‑self‑defense (unreasonable belief) instruction for the attempt counts.
- The court merged convictions under the one‑act/one‑crime rule into a single attempt (first‑degree murder) conviction and sentenced Russell to 45 years’ imprisonment (including a mandatory 25‑year firearm enhancement).
- On appeal Russell raised three issues: (1) ineffective assistance for failing to request an instruction on unreasonable belief in self‑defense (as to attempt), (2) trial court’s refusal to give a defense‑of‑dwelling instruction, and (3) excessiveness of the 45‑year sentence.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not requesting an instruction that an unreasonable belief in self‑defense negates intent for attempt (imperfect self‑defense) | Counsel not deficient because Illinois law does not recognize an attempt offense mitigated by imperfect self‑defense; such an instruction is unsupported by statute/case law | Failure to request the instruction prejudiced defendant because an unreasonable belief in self‑defense negates the specific intent element of attempt (first‑degree murder) and could have produced acquittal | Not ineffective: court held imperfect self‑defense cannot negate intent for attempt; counsel’s decision reasonable under existing law |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing a jury instruction on use of force in defense of a dwelling | No abuse: record lacked evidence of unlawful or tumultuous entry and lacked corroboration of any reasonable subjective belief of imminent assault | Instruction was warranted because defendant was in his garage, others approached, tensions existed, and witnesses reported banging/"calling his boys" | No abuse: insufficient evidence of entry/attempted entry in a violent/riotous/tumultuous manner or of a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary |
| Whether the 45‑year sentence (including 25‑year firearm enhancement) was excessive | Sentence justified given extreme harm to victim, aggravating factors, and statutory range; trial court properly weighed factors | Sentence excessive; should be nearer statutory minimum plus enhancement (31 years) given minimal priors, employment, family support, and unique circumstances unlikely to recur | Affirmed: 45 years within statutory range and not an abuse of discretion; trial court reasonably considered aggravating/mitigating factors |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance of counsel standard)
- People v. Reagan, 99 Ill. 2d 238 (1983) (no crime of attempt based on unreasonable belief in self‑defense)
- People v. Lopez, 166 Ill. 2d 441 (1995) (attempt statute requires intent to commit the specific offense; attempt(second‑degree murder) unavailable)
- People v. Sawyer, 115 Ill. 2d 184 (1986) (elements of defense‑of‑dwelling: violent/riotous/tumultuous entry and reasonable subjective belief)
- People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104 (1995) (imperfect self‑defense as statutory mitigation to second‑degree murder)
- People v. Stombaugh, 52 Ill. 2d 130 (1972) (deadly force to repel intruder; factual circumstances bearing on justification)
- People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205 (2010) (broad trial court discretion in sentencing; appellate review limited)