People v. Rubini
2021 IL App (2d) 200064-U
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2021Background
- Defendant Jacob A. Rubini was tried for home invasion and aggravated domestic battery (acquitted of attempted criminal sexual assault) arising from a November 25, 2018 incident at victim Kathleen Cramer’s condominium.
- Cramer testified Rubini entered her locked unit without permission, pinned her on the bed with his penis exposed, ripped off her clothing, struck her repeatedly and pulled out hair; photos and medical testimony showed bruising, rug burns, a bald spot, and a zygoma (cheekbone) fracture.
- A crowbar was later found by Cramer in her kitchen; police photographed damage to a sliding patio door; Cramer’s phone and camisole were recovered from defendant’s van.
- Defense theory: Rubini entered with Cramer’s permission (or was not a trespasser) and the incident was a later domestic altercation; defense called two witnesses (Lutz and Savage) who testified Rubini had been living with or dropped off at the condo on Nov. 24 and had been drinking; those witnesses also suggested the crowbar might belong to Cramer.
- Jury convicted Rubini of home invasion and aggravated domestic battery; trial court merged convictions and sentenced him to 20 years, finding the conduct resulted in great bodily harm and imposing an 85% truth-in-sentencing requirement.
- On appeal Rubini argued (1) ineffective assistance because defense witnesses bolstered the State’s case and undermined the defense, and (2) the injuries were insufficient as a matter of law to trigger the 85% great-bodily-harm sentencing enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Rubini) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defense counsel was ineffective for calling two defense witnesses who corroborated aspects of the State’s case | Calling Lutz and Savage was a reasonable strategic choice because their testimony supported the core defense (permission to enter; timeline; crowbar plausibly belonged to victim); any harms did not change outcome | No reasonably competent counsel would call witnesses who corroborated victim and added evidence of intoxication; the testimony undermined the defense and prejudiced the result | Affirmed: counsel’s decision fell within strategic range under Strickland; the witnesses supplied the only support for key defensive points, so no ineffective assistance proved |
| Whether the evidence proved "great bodily harm" for purposes of limiting good-conduct credit to 15% (truth-in-sentencing) | Victim’s wounds, corroborating photos, ER exam, and CT showing a cheekbone fracture and acute facial trauma amply supported a finding of great bodily harm | Injuries were largely superficial and comparable to cases where courts declined to find great bodily harm; thus 85% requirement unjustified | Affirmed: the jury and trial court reasonably found great bodily harm based on the nature, extent, and causation of injuries (including zygoma fracture and acute facial trauma) |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955) (deference to counsel’s strategic choices)
- People v. Mays, 91 Ill. 2d 251 (1982) (definition of ordinary battery injuries)
- People v. Figures, 216 Ill. App. 3d 398 (1991) (comparison of injuries for great-bodily-harm analysis)
- People v. Matthews, 126 Ill. App. 3d 710 (1984) (jury may find great bodily harm despite no hospitalization)
- In re J.A., 336 Ill. App. 3d 814 (2003) (limited evidence of stab wound insufficient for great bodily harm)
- In re T.G., 285 Ill. App. 3d 838 (1996) (discussion of stab wound severity and evidentiary showing)
- People v. Watkins, 243 Ill. App. 3d 271 (1993) (graze/grazing injuries may be insufficient for great bodily harm)
- People v. King, 316 Ill. App. 3d 901 (2000) (calling witnesses is ordinarily strategic and reviewed deferentially)